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The measurement problem and the role of observers have plagued quantum mechanics since its
conception. Attempts to resolve these have introduced anthropomorphic or non-realist notions into
physics. A shift of perspective based upon process theory and utilizing methods from combinatorial
games, interpolation theory and complex systems theory results in a novel realist version of quantum
mechanics incorporating quasi-local, nondeterministic hidden variables that are compatible with
the no-hidden variable theorems and relativistic invariance, and reproduce the standard results of
quantum mechanics to a high degree of accuracy without invoking observers.
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PREAMBLE
In spite of nearly a century of intense and profound the-
oretical and philosophical effort the measurement prob-
lem remains one of the outstanding problems in the
foundations of quantum mechanics [1], raising questions
about the nature of reality itself [2, 3]. Its resolution
would not only be a major achievement in quantum foun-
dations but might also resolve many outstanding para-
doxes such as Hardy’s paradox, Schrodinger’s cat, de-
layed choice, and perhaps provide new insight into quan-
tum gravity and the problems associated with the many
infinities of quantum field theory.
In this paper I propose a realist, quasi-local, nonde-
terministic, time directed, hidden variable model with-
out observers which is relativistically invariant, avoids
the no-hidden variable constraints, yet is capable of re-
producing all of the results of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics (NRQM) to a high degree of accuracy. It is
at least theoretically testable. In this model, quantum
mechanics emerges as the asymptotic limit of an inher-
ently unobservable and intrinsically discrete lower level
dynamics.
Many approaches have been taken to resolve this prob-
lem, varying in the degree to which they consider the
wave function as complete, incomplete, ontic or epistemic
[4]. The wave function may be considered as complete
and ontic, in which case additional assumptions are in-
corporated into the quantum mechanical formalism such
as multiple universes, multiple times (stochastic quanti-
zation), nonlinear terms (continuous spontaneous local-
ization), noise terms, decoherence. It may be consid-
ered complete and epistemic as in the consistent histories
approach. It may be considered incomplete and an ad-
ditional set of ‘hidden variables’ introduced (Bohmian
mechanics) or a lower level dynamics such as cellular
automata [5] or causal sets [6] is added. There have
also been attempts to reformulate quantum mechanics
in different mathematical languages [7] or using non-
Kolmogorovian probability theory [8].
Since the seminal writings of Bohr, the measurement
problem has generally been conflated with questions
about the role of observers, and whether or not a realist
model of quantum mechanics is possible. In the absence
of an ultimate level of reality, quantum phenomena ap-
pear not to possess definite properties without the inter-
vention of an observer. This brings a rather discomfiting
aspect of anthropomorphism into physical discourse. To
eliminate observers requires the assertion of an underly-
ing reality, but Bell’s research appears to show that any
such reality must possess rather odd features, such as
nonlocality. This paper explores the possibility that the
measurement problem and the many paradoxes of quan-
tum mechanics arise because of the unfortunate choice
of functional analysis on Hilbert spaces as the represen-
tational setting for its theory. A shift to a different rep-
resentational system can eliminate these problems while
still maintaining a realist metaphysics.
The approach taken here is based upon process theory
[9, 10], archetypal dynamics and emergence theory [11],
combinatorial game theory [12], forcing [13] and interpo-
lation theory [16]. It proposes a Planck or sub-Planck
scale dynamics from which quantum phenomena emerge
at larger scales. It assumes that states yield bounded
measurements and that wave functions are band-limited.
Modeled upon Whitehead’s ‘actual occasions’, its primi-
tive elements emerge into existence apparently possessing
spatio-temporal extension and definite properties, then
fade into nonexistence while leaving an informational
trace than can be carried forward by subsequent ele-
ments. Physical entities are viewed as emergent, infor-
mationally coherent patterns of primitive elements.
The core idea is derived from Whitehead’s process the-
ory, and considers all physical phenomena as emergent
from an ultimate reality of information laden entities
called actual occasions. The basic postulates are that
1. everything in reality is generated by process,
2. everything that we observe is emergent from an ul-
timate lowest level that itself is inherently unob-
2servable,
3. individual events of reality come into existence in
a discrete but non-localized form, and what we ob-
serve is a diffuse avatar, which extends over space
and time and constitutes a wave function,
4. this wave function is an emergent effect but it is
through such wave functions that observable phys-
ical phenomena arise.
Reality possesses two aspects - actual occasions, which
are the primitive experiential elements, and processes,
which generate the actual occasions. Manifest actual oc-
casions in turn influence which processes are active and
interacting. All physical entities are emergent from these
actual occasions. This poses intrinsic limits on the obser-
vational abilities of these entities. Individual actual occa-
sions cannot be observed, in general. Process too can be
inferred but not directly observed. Processes may be as-
cribed definite informational parameters which influence
the nature of the actual occasions that they generate,
which in turn influence the properties ascribed to the
resulting emergent physical entities. Processes generate
the actual occasions that manifest space and time, but
they themselves are to be viewed as having an existence
which stands outside of space-time. The quantum nature
of reality is a consequence of the discreteness manifesting
at the fundamental level while the wave nature of reality
is a consequence of the inability to resolve these funda-
mental events in space and time, thus physical reality
acquires emergent wave like aspects.
Process theory places emphasis upon three important
characteristics:
1. the unfolding of process in the manifestation of ac-
tual occasions is strongly determined by the context
generated by all participating processes and by the
dynamics of their interactions
2. observable aspects of physical reality - continu-
ity, space-time, physical entities, symmetries - are
emergent
3. processes interact through multiple forms of linear-
ity
It is commonly asserted that there are three fundamen-
tal differences between quantum phenomena and classical
phenomena. Quantum mechanics demonstrates:
1. the quantization of exchange in interactions
2. the existence of Non-Kolmogorovian probability
3. the existence of non-local influences
A major goal of this paper is to show that these fea-
tures may be true of classical systems as well, and their
putative absence is actually a reflection of the mathemat-
ical languages that have been used to describe the classi-
cal and quantum worlds rather than being properties of
those worlds in themselves. There are alternative formu-
lations of dynamics based on iterated function systems
and combinatorial games that can describe the classical
world and yet manifest these so-called quantum aspects.
An argument is given for an expansion of the language
used to describe fundamental processes beyond that of
functions and functions spaces to include iterated func-
tion systems and combinatorial games. In so doing, many
of the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics disap-
pear without the need to resort to anthropomorphism,
solipsism, and bizarre metaphysical constructs, and more
importantly, without the need to abandon realism.
INTRODUCTION
THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
In physics a physical system, at each point along its
world line, is assumed to exist in a state, and this state de-
termines all past and future states (at least in the absence
of interactions with other systems). In classical physics it
is assumed that this state can be described, usually in the
form of a set of parameters linked to physical constructs
such as position, linear momentum, angular momentum,
mass, energy, etc. and that a knowledge of the values
of these parameters for a given state suffices to predict
these values for past and future states. Such a descrip-
tion of a state is said to be complete, since no additional
information is required to enable these predictions to be
carried out. In classical physics these parameters are as-
sumed to be intrinsic ontological characteristics of the
system itself, independent of any other system. It is fur-
ther assumed that there exist particular systems termed
measurement apparatus that are capable of interacting
with the system in such a way as to manifest the values
of these parameters without inducing any change in the
system. Moreover, it is assumed that all such parameters
can, in principle, be simultaneously measured so that it
is possible, at least in principle, to actually obtain this
complete description of the state of a system. In classi-
cal physics it is possible to assert that a physical system
is, and that it has these properties as defined by these
parameter values.
The development of quantum mechanics raised serious
questions about the validity of these ideas. The discov-
ery by Heisenberg of the uncertainty relations appeared
to place fundamental limits on the degree of accuracy
with which measurements could be simultaneously car-
ried out. It appeared to be impossible to determine a
complete set of parameter values attributable to a given
state. Bohr suggested that measurements could not in
principle be separated from the conditions under which
3they were obtained. He wrote [17, pgs. 73,90]
every atomic phenomenon is closed in the
sense that its observation is based on regis-
trations obtained by means of suitable am-
plification devices with irreversible function-
ing such as, for example, permanent marks on
the photographic plate, caused by the pene-
trations of electrons into the emulsion... the
quantum mechanical formalism permits well-
defined applications referring only to such
closed phenomena and must be considered a
rational generalization of classical physics.
Fundamental entities appeared to manifest contradic-
tory properties, on the one hand appearing to be dis-
tributed in space-time while on the other hand manifest-
ing effects that appeared to be localized - the so-called
wave-particle duality. Properties appeared to occur dis-
cretely in some cases, continuously in another, such as
energy levels in bound and free particles respectively. It
appeared possible to create identical copies of systems
that on measurement yielded different values for some
parameters, such as occurs in superposition states.
All of these features depart profoundly from the classi-
cal conception. In quantum mechanics it appeared that
the best one could do was to ascribe a probability dis-
tribution for the results of any measurement procedure
applied to a quantum system. The notion of a state
changed from being a complete description of the pa-
rameter values to being a complete specification of the
probability distributions associated with measurements
of these values. While classical physics could assert that
at the lowest level of reality there existed definite some-
things that possessed definite properties whose values
were determined by measurements, quantum mechan-
ics could only assert that certain experimental arrange-
ments yielded stable probability distributions of measure-
ments but the status of any underlying ultimate reality
remained in doubt. A probability distribution is not a
thing in itself but rather is a description of frequencies
of occurrences of things. But it is not clear in quantum
mechanics who owns these things. Are they actual prop-
erties of the physical system being measured? If so then
ones encounters a decidedly non-realist view of reality
since quantum systems can manifest multiple values of
the same property while having indeterminate values of
other properties. Or are these so-called properties merely
outcomes of certain formalized types of interactions so
that they cannot be attributed to either the quantum
system or the measurement apparatus but only to the
context of the interaction, as Bohr has suggested? But
if so, then in what sense does the quantum system pos-
sess reality? What is its ontological status when it is
not in a measurement interaction? How do two quantum
systems interact and what determines such interactions
if not these properties and if it is these properties then
how do the quantum systems determine what they are in
the absence of a measurement interaction?
Problems associated with the ontological and episte-
mological status of quantum concepts have plagued the
theory since its inception and continue to this day. The
Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr emphasized the con-
textuality of measurement. Each measurement was to be
understood in the context of a quantum system interact-
ing with a classical measurement apparatus, and served
to link certain aspects of quantum systems to classical
measurement constructs. Unfortunately the pernicious
tendency to ignore the emergent and contextual nature
of classical properties and to view such properties as in-
trinsic to entities led to the persistent notion that quan-
tum properties do not exist unless there is an observer
and an observation to manifest them.
It is this feature that led to Wheeler’s famous dictum
that “No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until
it is a registered (observed) phenomenon”[1, pg. 184].
Manifestly though, reality exists without observers.
The universe existed long before there were living enti-
ties to observe it, and why should living entities possess
such a privileged status when they are physical entities
like all other physical entities?
There are two very specific problems associated with
the notion of measurement and that constitute the so-
called measurement problem. The first is the problem of
wave function collapse.
Non-relativistic quantum mechanics posits that the
state of a physical system is describable by a wave func-
tion Ψ which is governed by the Schrodinger equation
iℏ
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ
where H is an operator version of the classical Hamil-
tonian function for the system. H is a linear operator,
which is significant because it means that if Ψ1 and Ψ2
are both solutions of the Schrodinger equation then so is
w1Ψ1 + w2Ψ2 for arbitrary complex weights w1, w2.
Measurement is described entirely differently. To each
measurement situation there corresponds an operator, A
and the possible results of a measurement are given by
the eigenvalues of this operator, i.e. those values which
satisfy the equation
AΨ = λΨ
Suppose that Ψ1 is a solution corresponding to eigen-
value λ1 and Ψ2 is a second solution corresponding to
eigenvalue λ2. Then the sum is a solution, but what
value is ascribable to a measurement of such a system?
Applying A to the sum yields
A(Ψ1+Ψ2) = AΨ1+AΨ2 = λ1Ψ1+λ2Ψ2 6= λ(Ψ1+Ψ2)
4The sum is not an eigenvector of A so it would ap-
pear that no measurement can be ascribed to the su-
perposition. In fact, if such a superposition is measured
it does yield definite measured values, λ1 and λ2 but
these appear randomly with frequencies proportional to
< Ψ∗1|Ψ1 > and < Ψ∗2|Ψ2 > respectively.
The time evolution of a quantum system is determined
by a (linear) unitary operator, so that the time evolution
of a superposition under Schro¨dinger evolution always
remains a superposition - so how can it ever yield a def-
inite measurement? This was a problem recognized by
von Neumann [18] and later discussed by London and
Bauer[19]. The long held conventional solution is that
somehow as a result of a measurement the wave function
undergoes a discontinuous transition from the superposi-
tion to one of the eigenstates that comprise the superpo-
sition. This transition occurs probabilistically with tran-
sition probabilities given by the norm of the respective
eigenfunction.
There is nothing, however, in the Schro¨dinger form of
quantum mechanics that allows for such a ‘collapse’ of
the wave function. It appears neither in the Schro¨dinger
formulation nor in the measurement postulate. It must
be added separately. Thus this is an ad hoc assumption
that to date lacks any physical explanation despite many
attempts[20][21][22] to give it one, including introducing
decay factors into the wave function, nonlinearities into
the Schrodinger equation, positing the existence of quan-
tum splitting and multiple universes, or the presence of
superselection rules that limit solutions.
The notion of measurement per se is a classical con-
struct, founded upon the behaviour of classical systems
in interaction with measurement apparatus. There is no
reason a priori that this classical measurement notion
should apply to quantum systems. Moreover, unless one
is a dogmatic reductionist, there is no reason a priori
to believe that the laws of quantum mechanics should
apply to classical systems, particularly given the emer-
gent nature of classical systems. These are two realms
which, when separated by sufficiently large spatial and
temporal scales, manifest distinct features and possess
quite distinct mathematical descriptions. Their effective
theories are quite distinct. Indeed, the archetypal dy-
namical perspective described in a later section begins
with the understanding that the classical and quantum
realms constitute distinct categories of reality and re-
quire distinct frames of reference for their interpretation
and to formulate interactions within them. The quan-
tum mechanical notion of measurement is an attempt to
bridge the quantum and classical realms. As Bohr repeat-
edly emphasized, the idea of measurement is a classical
construct and the result of a measurement is a classical
object, to whit, a mark, that can be apprehended by a
human observer. The first problem thus arises due to an
attempt to apply classical concepts in a top-down fash-
ion to the quantum realm. The second problem arises
from an application of the reductionist paradigm and
the attempt to apply quantum concepts to the classi-
cal realm. This second aspect arises from the attempt
to treat the measurement apparatus as a quantum me-
chanical object. As London and Bauer demonstrated,
the assumption that the measurement apparatus has a
description as a quantum mechanical entity simply re-
sults in a more complicated superposition of states, now
including both the system and the measurement appa-
ratus. The entire coupled system now evolves according
to a more complicated wave equation, which, by virtue
of its linearity, requires an observer to collapse it. Incor-
porating this new observer into the situation leads to an
infinite regress, a reductionist nightmare.
Shimony showed [23, pg. 34] that even with approxi-
mate measurements, the quantum state of a system will
not undergo a transition to an eigenstate under the usual
Schrodinger dynamics.
The apparent necessity for some nonphysical process
to intervene in order to collapse the wave function has
led to several schools of thought. One school proposes
that reality requires the active participation of an ob-
server to make it manifest. This introduces an element
of psychology (and sometimes mysticism) into physics.
A second prominent school of thought suggests that the
wave function is a mathematical convenience which en-
ables the calculation of various correlations and functions
but which has no counterpart in reality. Some view the
wave function as reflecting our ignorance of knowledge of
a system, but who’s ignorance and why is every observer’s
ignorance exactly the same? There is an alternative view,
however, that treats the wave function as if it were an ac-
tual physical wave, with a physical phase [24]. Indeed a
recent paper [25] has proposed a theorem which appears
to demonstrate that the wave function must be real in or-
der to obtain the standard quantum mechanical results.
But in that case what does it represent? A distribution of
probability? Probability of what? How can a probability
be physical? A distribution of mass? Of charge? How
does one reconcile that with observed point-like nature
of fundamental particles? If the wave function is real,
then how to account for the observed quantum nature of
quantum interactions? Energy is exchanged in quantum
packets but how is this to occur if there is a physically
real wave function distributed over space and time? How
is it that only one part of the wave contributes to the
transfer of energy when both systems have waves that
are equally distributed? Why, if the wave is in a super-
position of individual eigenfunctions, does the result of
a measurement leave the wave in a single eigenfunction?
How does such a transformation occur? How can a par-
ticle have multiple energies yet transfer only a specific
energy?
A less prominent school of thought is that of realism,
which holds that at the level of ultimate reality there are
actual entities and that quantum mechanics is not the
5final theory, but needs to be supplemented by a deeper
theory of so-called hidden variables. Debates about such
hidden variables go back to Einstein and Bohr and con-
tinue today in questions concerning whether or not hid-
den variable models are even capable of reproducing the
results of quantum mechanics.
REALISM, HIDDEN VARIABLES AND
NONLOCALITY
The heart of the problem lies in the question whether
the elements of NRQM describe physical reality or are
mathematical conveniences that simply enable calcula-
tion. This debate has raged since the time of Einstein
and Bohr and was thought to be resolved in the famous
hidden variable theorems of Bell [26] and their subse-
quent experimental verification beginning with the ex-
periments of Aspect [27]. Realist models of quantum me-
chanics have been around since De Broglie first proposed
the idea of a ‘pilot wave’, later developed by Bohm into a
fully realized ontological model [28]. The basic idea is to
rewrite the wave function as a product, Ψ = R exp(iSℏ)
where R and S are subject to the differential equations
∂S
∂t
+
(∇S)2
2m
+ V − ℏ
2
2m
∇2R
R
= 0
which can be understood as a Hamilton-Jacobi equation
for a particle with momentum p = ∇S moving normal to
a wave front S = constant under an additional quantum
potential Q = − ℏ22m ∇
2R
R while
∂R2
∂t
+∇ ·
(
R2
∇S
m
)
= 0
describes the conservation of probability for an ensemble
of such particles having a probability density P = R2.
Bohm interprets these equations as representing the
motion of a definite particle coupled to a quantum field
given by Ψ (which satisfies the Schrodinger equation).
The equation of motion of the particle is given by
m
dv
dt
= −∇(V )−∇(Q)
The quantum potential does not depend upon the am-
plitude of the wave in the sense that multiplying the wave
function by a constant does not change the value of the
quantum potential. It depends only upon the form of the
wave. A similar situation pertains in signal theory where
the information content of a signal depends upon its form
but not upon its intensity. Bohm and Hiley make the im-
portant point that the quantum potential acts upon the
particle not as a form of energy but rather as a form
of information. Such information is not to be under-
stood in the Shannon sense as a reduction of uncertainty
but rather in the semantic sense as providing knowledge
about the physical environment within which the parti-
cle is moving. This usage of information is uncommon in
physics and engineering but virtually universal in most
other fields of human endeavor.
Bohm’s theory is generally described as a hidden vari-
able model although as Bohm himself points out there
are actually no hidden variables in the model. Rather the
most important aspect of Bohm’s model is that it pro-
vides a realist ontological interpretation of quantum me-
chanics in its assertion that actual particles exist whose
motion is guided by the addition of the quantum poten-
tial which imparts a stochastic character to their motion
as a result of nonlinear effects.
This quantum potential is decidedly nonlocal in its ef-
fect which appears to occur instantaneously. This appar-
ent violation of relativistic constraints has limited accep-
tance of Bohm’s approach but to be fair nothing is being
stated as to the ontological character of this quantum
potential. While relativity limits the speed at which any
signal may propagate there is no suggestion that the in-
formation provided by the quantum potential propagates
as a signal.
The issue of nonlocality is often raised in associa-
tion with hidden variable models of quantum mechan-
ics. This will be discussed below but hidden variables
are not necessary for nonlocality to arise as an issue in
quantum mechanics. It appears even in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics in the case of entanglement. For
simplicity consider the case of photon pair production
through parametric down conversion. Photon polariza-
tion gives rise to two possible states |0 > and |1 >.
Pair production results in an entangled state of the form
Ψ = 1√
2
|0 > |0 > + 1√
2
|1 > |1 >. Measurement of the
polarization of one photon automatically guarantees the
state of polarization of the second photon, no matter how
far the two photons are separated spatially. Experiments
have demonstrated that the speed with which this trans-
fer of information occurs is well in excess of the speed
of light [29]. Shimony has called this a non controllable
nonlocality, meaning that it cannot be used to send a
signal between two space-like separated observers. This
stands in distinction to a controllable nonlocality, which
would violate the relativistic constraint. Nonlocality ap-
pears to be a feature of the quantum realm regardless of
whether or not hidden variables might appear at some
lower level.
Bell [26] considered the possibility of there being a set
of hidden variables from which quantum mechanical cor-
relations might be derived. In his formulation he did not
require that these hidden variables be deterministic. In
fact he explicitly stated “It is a matter of indifference in
the following whether λ denotes a single variable or a set,
or even a set of functions, and whether the variables are
discrete or continuous.”[26, pg. 15]. The issue of whether
or not these hidden variables are deterministic is not ger-
6mane to his argument. In fact in proving his result it is
necessary to assume that these variables are distributed
with some probability distribution ρ. Whether this distri-
bution arises due to ignorance on the part of the observer
or some inherent stochastic dynamics is irrelevant.
There is a subtlety here which has been discussed in
detail by Bunge [30]. There is a notion of determination,
which refers to how physical entities acquire their prop-
erties, and the mechanisms of such determination, which
may be deterministic, non-deterministic or stochastic.
The realist view is an assertion that the properties of
physical entities are determined in advance, regardless of
the mechanism. Hidden variables provide a vehicle to
explain how such determination arises. The non-realist
view is an assertion that these properties are not deter-
mined in advance but arise solely out of the interaction
with some observer. In physics, the notion of determina-
tion is often conflated with the notion of a deterministic
mechanism but that is an error according to Bunge. The
requirement for deterministic mechanisms is more ideo-
logical than ontological since the discovery of determinis-
tic chaos has blurred the boundary between deterministic
and stochastic mechanisms. The real issue is whether or
not at the lowest levels of reality there exist actual enti-
ties which can be ascribed values given by these hidden
variables and which subsequently determine physical en-
tities.
In his argument Bell considered a pair of spin entan-
gled particles a, b. Assume that spin measurements are
made in the directions a,b and that along these direc-
tions the spins take the values ±1. Let E(a,b) be the
expectation value of the product of the measured values
for a in the direction a and for b in the direction b. Let c
be a third direction. Bell assumes first of all that, given
some probability measure on the set of hidden variables,
the expectation value of the product is calculated as
E(a,b) =
∫
Λ
v(a, a)v(b,b)dλ
where v(a, a) gives the value measured in system a at
angle a.
Bell showed that, if an additional assumption of local-
ity is made (meaning that the expectation values of one
system must be independent of both the angles measured
and the measurement received in the other system), then
the following inequality holds
1 + E(b, c) ≧ |E(a,b) − E(a, c)|
Nonlocality plays a central role in providing constraints
upon the nature of hidden variables that might be in-
volved in determining quantum phenomena. Since Bell’s
original work, two specific forms of nonlocality have been
identified, parameter independence and outcome inde-
pendence. Parameter independence means that the be-
haviour of one system does not depend upon the particu-
lar choice of property to be measured on another system.
Outcome independence means that the behaviour of one
system does not depend upon the particular outcome of
a measurement of another system. As Shimony points
out [23, pg. 90], a violation of parameter independence
would permit a form of controllable nonlocality which
could lead to a violation of relativistic constraints. A vi-
olation of outcome independence can at most lead merely
to a form of non controllable nonlocality, and indeed the
phenomenon of entanglement provides a prima facie case
of violation of outcome independence.
The existence of entanglement demonstrates that any
model of quantum phenomena will of necessity need to
manifest some form of nonlocality. Bell’s theorem pro-
vides additional evidence for nonlocality by demonstrat-
ing that any model of quantum mechanics involving hid-
den variables that possesses both forms of locality will of
necessity lead to predictions that will violate the inequali-
ties. These inequalities generally involve systems that are
separated spatially. Bell’s work involved space-like sepa-
rated systems and was extended by Leggett and Garg [31]
to include systems that are separated temporally. While
the phenomenon of entanglement demonstrates that non-
locality must be a feature at the observable level, the Bell
and Leggett-Garg results show that nonlocality must be
a feature of any model at any level.
There is, however, a subtle assumption in the formula-
tion of Bell’s Theorem which has never been questioned
until recent times. This assumption is that the proba-
bility theory to be associated with any classical process
must be Kolmogorovian in nature, so that the formula
for the calculation of the individual correlation functions
must be Kolmogorovian in form. It is well known that the
corresponding formula in the quantum mechanical case is
non-Kolmogorovian, as it contains an interference term.
The assumption that a classical system must necessarily
follow a Kolmogorovian probability structure does not
seem to be questioned in the literature on Bell’s theo-
rem. Accepting that assumption then forces any hidden
variable model to possess an inherent non-locality. But
if this assumption is false, as has been conjectured by
Palmer [32] and Khrennikov [8] as discussed below, then
the conclusion that a hidden variable model must be non-
local no longer holds. The following section discusses the
idea of non-Kolmogorovian probability and demonstrates
that it is not necessarily a perquisite of quantum mechan-
ics and can apply to classical systems as well, especially
those generated by iterated function systems and games.
This will suggest that a change in the model used to ex-
press the underlying dynamics to include iterated func-
tion systems or game based dynamics might open the
door to realist local or quasi-local models.
7NON-KOLMOGOROVIAN PROBABILITY
The concept of probability is fundamental to the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics. It is also the source
of much of the conceptual confusion and paradoxes that
confound quantum mechanics. Hidden variable theo-
rems based upon Bell type inequalities involving relations
between various correlation functions depend intimately
upon the structure of the probability theory within which
these functions are defined and constructed. Indeed that
is the very point used by Palmer [32] in his demonstration
of a hidden variable model of quantum mechanics using
iterated function systems. In that model he showed that
it was impossible to construct the required three state
correlation functions on account of chaotic effects. As a
result the Bell inequalities could be defeated.
Most people are used to probability theory based upon
the axioms of Kolmogorov. The situation in probability
today is similar to that in geometry in the 19th century.
For two thousand years, Euclidean geometry had held
sway as the one true model of geometry. This conception
eventually gave way to the realization that there were
actually many different types of geometry, just as there
turned out to be many different forms of logic and of
set theory. It turns out that there are many different
forms of probability theory as well. Probabilities associ-
ated to classical events are generally held to be modeled
exclusively by Kolmogorov type probability theory. That
assumption forms a necessary part of the creation of the
various Bell inequalities. That this assumption turns out
not to be true forms the central thesis of this section.
Probability theory began in the 17th century in the
correspondence between Pascal and Fermat on games of
chance. There the goal was to aid the gambler in mak-
ing decisions that would enable them to maximize their
profit from playing these games. Probability was linked
directly to the idea of frequency. The probability of an
outcome was the limiting value of the fraction of times
that the event occurred during the play of the game as
the number of plays was extended to infinite time. Any
individual play of a game resulted in fractions that var-
ied from this number but with repeated play the average
of these fractions would tend to the limiting value. This
is a consequence of Gauss’s celebrated law of large num-
bers which shows that in repeated measurements of this
value the distribution of individual measurements of the
value follows a normal distribution. The beautiful math-
ematical properties of the normal distribution led to its
widespread misapplication for more than a century even
though natural phenomena manifest events that follow a
diversity of probability distributions. This has had seri-
ous consequences in fields such as psychology, medicine
and economics [33]
Probability theory was placed on firm mathematical
ground in the early 20th century by Kolmogorov, who
formulated a set of formal axioms based on set theory and
analysis, and subsequently elaborated by Carathe´odory
with his work on measure theory. Crucial to Kol-
mogorov’s theory are three axioms.
1. Let Ω be a set and E ⊂ P(Ω). A probability mea-
sure P is a map from E to [0, 1] such that P (Ω) = 1
and P (A1∪. . .∪An∪. . .) = P (A1)+. . .+P (An)+. . .
for disjoint sets Ai
2. The conditional probability of A given B is defined
as P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)/P (B)
3. Events A,B are said to be independent if P (A ∩
B) = P (A)P (B).
The definition of conditional probability above yields
the following formula of total probability: For any
partition {Ai} of E, and any B ∈ E,, P (B) =
P (A1)P (B|A1) + . . . + P (An)P (B|An) + . . .. Quantum
mechanics changed this profoundly. Feynman [34] asserts
that
The concept of probability is not altered in
quantum mechanics. When we say that the
probability of a certain outcome of an exper-
iment is p, we mean the conventional thing,
i.e., that if the experiment is repeated many
times, one expects that the fraction of those
which give the outcome in question is roughly
p. What is changed, and changed radically,
is the method of calculating probabilities.
The wave function of non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics is most often viewed as giving rise to a proba-
bility distribution of the form P = Ψ∗Ψ. This simple
interpretation, attributed to Born, actually belies a deep
subtlety. Consider the case in which one has a system
upon which one may perform two different measurements
a, b resulting in the dichotomous outcomes a = {a1, a2}
and b = {b1, b2}. Kolmogorov theory shows that the sum
of probabilities takes the form
P (b = β) =
∑
ai
P (a = ai)P (b = β|a = ai)
However, if one attempts the same calculation in a
quantum mechanical setting using the Born rule then one
obtains the formula
8P (b = β) =
∑
ai
P (a = ai)P (b = β|a = ai) + 2 cos θ
√
P (a = a1)P (b = β|a = a1)P (a = a2)P (b = β|a = a2)
instead. From this result alone it is clear that quantum
probability theory is of a non-Kolmogorovian type. In-
deed as noted by Khrennikov, inequalities of Bell type
were developed much earlier in probability theory dat-
ing back to the time of Boole and arise in situations in
which one attempts to determine correlations when it
is impossible to define those correlations using a single
Kolmogorov probabilty space. Khrennikov [8] comments
that even Kolmogorov in his original writings on prob-
ability was more sophisticated than later writers. He
writes “For him (Kolmogorov) it was totally clear that
it is very naive to expect that all experimental contexts
can be described by a single (perhaps huge) probability
space”[8, pg. 26]. It may not to possible to measure all
of these observables simultaneously. The issue is then
whether or not a set of observables exhibits probabilis-
tic compatibility or incompatibility, that is, whether it
is possible to construct a single probability space serving
for the entire family. It is certainly not true in quan-
tum mechanics due to the noncommutative nature of the
set of self adjoint operators representing quantum mea-
surements and the presence of interference terms arising
from probabilities based on Born’s rule. It is also not true
of classical system in general, something that has been
mostly ignored (Simpson’s paradox in the social sciences
is an example of this).
Nonlocality is not required in order to obtain those
results. They are wholly dependent upon the nature of
the observables being measured and whether or not a
single Kolmogorov probability space can be constructed.
These observations raise questions as to whether it is ab-
solutely impossible to have local hidden variable models
at the lowest levels.
Failure of Additivity
The rule of additivity is fundamental in Kolmogorov’s
formulation of the laws of probability, providing one of its
axioms. It holds, mostly, in non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics. Indeed suppose that a single quantum system
can exist in one of a set of distinct energy eigenstates
Ψi. These energy eigenstates form an orthonormal set of
functions in some Hilbert space. Suppose that the system
is now created in a linear superposition of these energy
eigenstates as is permitted by the Schrodinger equation.
The wave function for this superposition will take the
form Ψ =
∑
i wiΨi where the weights wi are chosen so
that
∑
i |w|2i = 1 which ensures that Ψ can be inter-
preted in its own right as a probability distribution. This
guarantees that < Ψ∗|Ψ >= ∑ij w∗iwj < Ψ∗i |Ψj >=∑
i |w|2i = 1.
When the energy of such a quantum system is mea-
sured it will yield a single value corresponding to one
of these energy eigenstates. If the system is subjected
to repeated measurements of its energy it will remain in
the same energy eigenstate. This is considered due to
the collapse of the wave function that occurs as a result
of the measurement process. If multiple identically cre-
ated copies of the system have their energies measured
then these energies will be distributed according to the
probability distribution given by (w21 , . . . , w
2
n, . . .).
The expectation value of the energy is given by
Eˆ =
∑
iw
2
iEi. Suppose though that one asks
a slightly different question, namely, fix some re-
gion of space, say R, and ask what is the expecta-
tion value of the energy over the region R. This
is calculated as EˆR =
∫
R
∑
i
∑
j w
∗
iwjΨ
∗
iEjΨjdV =∑
i
∑
j w
∗
iwjEj
∫
R
Ψ∗iΨjdV . Rewriting yields EˆR =∑
j Ej
∑
iw
∗
iwj
∫
RΨ
∗
iΨjdV . One sees that the new
probability associated to each energy Ei is no longer w
2
i
but rather the more complicated
∑
iw
∗
iwj
∫
R
Ψ∗iΨjdV .
This is due to the fact that the wave functions may over-
lap on R. It is only in the context of the entire space-time
that the wave functions are orthogonal. There is no guar-
antee that
∑
i
∑
i w
∗
iwj
∫
RΨ
∗
iΨjdV = 1 so these proba-
bilities are not additive even though the events, namely
the Ei cover the range of possible energy values.
Also note that in constructing a superposition state
one is in essence constructing a sum of probabilities for
if λi is the eigenvalue associated with eigenstate Ψi then
the probability based upon the wave function of a super-
position becomes
Ψ∗Ψ = [
∑
i
P (Ψi)P (λi|Ψi)] + interference terms
This problem is frequently considered to be a feature
of quantum mechanics because the quantum mechanical
formalism allows for the phenomenon of quantum inter-
ference. That it appears in the classical realm as well is
illustrated by the following simple model. Most everyone
is familiar with the Danish children’s toy, LEGO. Typ-
ical LEGO pieces are blocks of plastic having tiny solid
cylinders protruding on the top surface of the block and
corresponding cylindrical tubes in place on the under-
surface. There are plates that can be used for mounting
LEGO block structures. Consider the following scenario.
There is a 2×2 mounting block fixed inside a sealed box.
9Within the box is a bag containing a 1 × 1 block and a
2×2 block. There is dial on the outside of the box which
reads 0,1,2. When the dial is set, a reading is taken of the
plate and a light turns on corresponding to whether there
is no block on the plate (0), a 1× 1 block, whether alone
or combined with a 2× 2 block (1) or a 2× 2 block again
alone or in combination with a 1×1 block (2). The exam-
iner cannot look in the box and in fact has no knowledge
of the contents of the box. They can only switch the dial
and note whether or not a light appears. In another room
a researcher can remotely arrange whatever they like on
the plate: no block, a 1 × 1, or a 2 × 2 block and they
change the arrangement immediately following each ob-
servation of the examiner. Clearly the probabilities of no
block, a 1×1 block or a 2×2 block are all 1/3. Therefore
for the examiner the probabilities of obtaining a light for
0,1,2 are all 1/3.
Now let us change the game slightly. The researcher
is now permitted to take no action, place a 1 × 1 or a
2 × 2 block on the plate, or to couple the 1 × 1 block
to the top of the 2 × 2 block and affix this to the plate.
Setting the dial to 1 or 2 results in a light so long as the
corresponding block is present regardless of whether it
is alone or in combination. Note that it is impossible in
this arrangement to measure for 1 and 2 simultaneously.
Now what is the probability of there being a light on 1?
This probability is 1/2 because there is a 1/4 probability
of there being a single 1×1 block and a 1/4 probability of
there being a 1× 1− 2× 2 combination. The same holds
for the probability of a light on 2, while the probability
of a light on 0 remains 1/4. Note that now P (0)+P (1)+
P (2) = 1/4+1/2+1/2 = 11/2. As far as the examiner is
concerned, the outcomes are disjoint but the sum is not
additive to 1.
A standard argument to correct this problem is to as-
sert that the space of alternatives has been incorrectly
constructed. If the examiner is allowed to look at the
blocks then they might argue that only the global config-
urations constitute allowable events and these decompose
into four equal probabilities, and then the probabilities
of occurrence of the individual smaller blocks can be de-
termined using conditional probabilities as per the Kol-
mogorov scheme. In such a case the probability of a 1x1
block becomes: P (1×1) = P (0)P (1×1|0)+P (1×1)P (1×
1|1× 1)+P (1× 1+ 2× 2)P (1× 1|1× 1+ 2× 2)+P (2×
2)P (1 × 1|2 × 2) =1/4× 0 + 1/4× 1 + 1/4× 1 + 1/4×
0 = 1/2, which is the result given above. But this is a
mathematical cheat because it assumes knowledge that
the examiner does not and cannot possess. From the
point of view of the examiner the space of alternatives
was correctly constructed and they are disjoint. However
they must also accept the necessity to introduce an in-
teraction term, or to accept a non-standard form for the
calculation of the total probability, namely P (total) =
P (0) + P (1) + P (2) + I(0, 1, 2) = 1/4 + 1/2 + 1/2− 1/4.
Arguing that this scenario is contrived is also a cheat
because this is precisely the situation for the experimen-
tal physicist. Measurement devices provide only the re-
sults of measurements, they do not yield the states of
the systems being measured which cannot be directly ob-
served. The idea of an particle being in a superposition
comes out of theory, not direct observation. As in many
cases experiments are contrived to create a collection of
particles in a pre-determined state so that the examiner
has some knowledge beforehand. If no such knowledge
is obtainable, or if simultaneous measurements cannot
be made it may not be possible to confirm the existence
of such interaction states so as to expand the space of
alternatives in such a manner so as to preseve the Kol-
mogorov property. The preservation of Kolmogorovian
probability appears to require that one begin with the
most basic ‘natural kinds’ from which all other functions
are derived, but if we do not know that combinations
exist we can only deal with the event set in hand.
Interference creates a failure of the usual additivity in
the quantum mechanical case and in this classical case
as well. Thus one must accept that the Kolmogorov ax-
ioms may work well in many circumstances but there
may be other situations in which they fail, and instead
of denying the validity of these alternative situations, we
should embrace the idea that, just as in the acceptance
of non-Euclidean geometry, we should accept the idea of
non-Kolmogorovian probability theories. There is noth-
ing a priori wrong with the question that the examiner
asks, nor the interpretation made of the conditions under
which the question is to be answered, unless one requires
that the answer follow the conditions of Kolmogorovian
probability theory. Instead this very simple example
urges us to accept the existence of non-Kolmogorovian
probability theories, even in the classical setting, and in
situations in which the basic elements of observations are
derived from prior conditions that are able to interact or
superpose in some manner. Such possibilities are abun-
dant in quantum mechanics but also in the life and so-
cial sciences. Khrennikov has emphasized this point in
his extensive writings on non-Kolmogorovian probability
theory [8]. The problem arises in this example because
the Lego pieces are able to interact. The problem arises
in quantum mechanics because in a superposition state
the individual eigenstates interact. There is no funda-
mental difference between these two cases. Kolmogorov
theory presumes that there is no interaction between in-
dividual events and that distinct events correspond to
distinct natural kinds. This example might seem trivial
yet it lies at the heart of the problem of measurement.
When we consider an electron, for example, in a superpo-
sition of distinct energy states, what exactly do we mean?
When we ask the question of its energy, we are asking ex-
actly the question of the examiner above whether or not
when we observe the electron do we observe one of its
supposed constituent energy states. We do not think of
the superposed electron as a different natural kind from
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the non-superposed electrons. Rather we think of an elec-
tron in a particular state, and that very same electron can
change state into one of the energy eigenstates or back
into a different superposed energy state. The electron is
the natural kind, not the state. Moreover an electron, to
the best knowledge available today, does not appear to
be composed of smaller natural kinds, it is a single whole.
The point to be made is that in any model provid-
ing a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics it is
necessary to pay close attention to the subtle nature of
interactions among the various elements that make up
the model. One must be very careful not to project fun-
damental features of Kolmogorovian probability theory
onto non-Kolmogorovian probability theories. These are
subtle conceptual and logical errors which I suspect have
arisen time and time again in our attempts to under-
stand quantum mechanics. Over the past century we
have become comfortable with non-Euclidean geometry
and such logical errors no longer plague the field. Hope-
fully the same may one day be true of quantum mechan-
ics. The most important consideration in constructing
an alternative model of quantum mechanics is to ensure
that the non-Kolmogorovian nature of the probabilities
be preserved in the model.
There are other issues at play besides the type of con-
stitutional interference as noted above. The inability
to construct a single space upon which all of the prob-
ability functions can be constructed is another feature
that is frequently ignored, even in the classical applica-
tion of Kolmogorovian probability theory. This problem
arises when one has a collection of distinct suitable state
spaces upon which Kolmogorovian probabilities are de-
veloped and then one attempts to combine these into a
single space in order to calculate correlations and condi-
tional probabilities and still expect the original individual
probabilities to be derivable. Probability theorists have
known for a century that such a construction is not al-
ways possible and yet time and again researchers proceed
as if they can carry out such a construction.
In the model to be constructed below we shall utilize
combinatorial games with tokens which frequently give
rise to non-Kolmogorovian probability structures.
Failure of Stationarity
Let us consider another classical example. Consider
the following iterated function system, denoted φ. Con-
sider a simple 2 × 2 block into which we place different
numbers. For example one might configure the block as
1 2
4 3
. There are two transformations α, β which can be
applied to such a block. Transformation α interchanges
the elements in the first row. Thus α(
1 2
4 3
) =
2 1
4 3
while transformation β interchanges the elements in the
second row, so β(
1 2
4 3
) =
1 2
3 4
. Now consider an it-
erative function system defined on the space of blocks
{ 1 2
4 3
,
2 1
4 3
,
1 2
3 4
,
2 1
3 4
}. For simplicity denote this set
as {a, b, c, d} respectively.
Applying α, β to this set induces the following trans-
formations where a move to the right represents an ap-
plication of α and a move down represents an application
of β.
a → b → a
↓ ↓ ↓
c → d → c
↓ ↓ ↓
a → b → a
If we start with a and repeatedly apply α, β we will
end up with a collection of possible sequences of blocks
which can be represented in the form of a tree in which
an arrow down and to the left means apply α and down
and to the right means apply β.
a
ւ ց
b c
ւ ց ւ ց
a d a
ւ ց ւ ց ւ ց
b c b c
Each layer represents a possible outcome after a fixed
n iterations. In order to determine the probability of ob-
serving a particular outcome one must sum up the num-
ber of paths leading to said outcome and then divide by
the total number of possible paths. Summing over the
paths leading to each outcome leads to a tree diagram
1
ւ ց
1 1
ւ ց ւ ց
1 2 1
ւ ց ւ ց ւ ց
1 3 3 1
Dividing by the total number of paths at each level
gives
1
ւ ց
1/2 1/2
ւ ց ւ ց
1/4 1/2 1/4
ւ ց ւ ց ւ ց
1/8 3/8 3/8 1/8
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We now find the probability for a given outcome by
summing over the probabilities for all paths leading to
the outcome. This yields the following probability distri-
butions:
Level 0 : f = (1, 0, 0, 0), Level 1 : g = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0),
Level 2 : h = (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2), Level 3 : g = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0).
Thus as we successively iterate the system, the
probability distributions at successive times oscillate
f, g, h, g, h, g . . ..
It is important to note that no probability distribu-
tion has been assigned a priori to the choices of the el-
ements α, β. If a probability is pre-assigned then the
above probabilities need to be modified by multiplying
each path segment by the probability assigned to the par-
ticular path choice, either α or β.
The above model provides a simple, non-deterministic
dynamical system which is entirely classical, where the
probabilities are determined by a discrete version of real
valued path integrals, and which yield temporally oscil-
lating, spatially non-stationary probability distributions.
The point of this example is to highlight the fact that
quantum mechanical systems are not alone in having a
probability structure that can be calculated utilizing path
integrals. Combinatorial based classical systems such as
the example described above and many combinatorial
games possess this path integral structure. Whether or
not there exists a limiting stationary probability distribu-
tion over the state space depends upon the tree structure
induced by the dynamics of the combinatorial operations.
Most iterated function systems involving actions on a
continuous real space require some form of contraction
so as to ensure that an invariant or stationary measure
exists on the state space.
Failure of the Law of Total Probability
Let us stay with the block space. Consider a sec-
ond iterated function system acting on the same space
of blocks. Call it ρ. This time we have a single function
γ acting on the block space. The action of γ on any block
is to interchange the first and second columns. That is
β(
1 2
4 3
) =
2 1
3 4
.
The action of γ on the block space is simple: a → d
and b→ c.
Again starting with block a and repeating the proce-
dure of the previous section yields the following proba-
bility distributions:
Level 0 : f = (1, 0, 0, 0), Level 1 : j = (0, 0, 0, 1), Level
2 : i = (1, 0, 0, 0), Level 3 : j = (0, 0, 0, 1).
Note that the distribution for ρ is distinct from
φ in the previous example and that these represent
two distinct iterated function systems. Now let us
consider the iterated function system σ on the block
space generated by {α, β, γ}. Again start with block a.
Applying either of α, β or γ yields the outcomes b, d, c.
Applying the maps to these outcomes yields outcomes
a, c, d, c, a, b, d, b, a. Outcomes are repeated in the above
listing as each represents a distinct path down the tree.
Applying the maps once more yields the 27 outcomes
b, d, c, d, b, a, c, a, b, d, b, a, b, d, c, a, c, d, c, a, b, a, c, d, b, d,c.
The probability distributions are thus
Level 0 : f = (1, 0, 0, 0), Level 1 : k = (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3),
Level 2 : l = (1/3, 2/9, 2/9, 2/9), Level 3 : m =
(2/9, 7/27, 7/27, 7/27).
We may denote this iterated function system as σ =
(2/3)φ + (1/3)ρ. If we combine their probability distri-
butions then we would obtain
Level 0 : f = (1, 0, 0, 0), Level 1 : 2/3g + 1/3j =
2/3(0, 1/2, 1/2, 0) = 1/3(0, 1, 0, 0) = (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0),
Level 2 : 2/3h + 1/3i = 2/3(1/2, 0, 0, 1/2) +
1/3(1, 0, 0, 0) = (2/3, 0, 0, 1/3), Level 3 : 2/3g + 1/3j =
2/3(0, 1/2, 1/2, 0)+ 1/3(0, 1, 0, 0) = (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0).
Note that k 6= 2/3g + 1/3j, l 6= 2/3h + 1/3i and
m 6= 2/3g + 1/3j. Thus although these probabilities
should add according to the usual notions of probabil-
ity theory they do not because there is an interaction
effect. In this case, although φ and ρ are distinct it-
erated functions systems and their superposition gives
rise to a perfectly good iterated function system, the re-
sulting probability distribution functions cannot be ob-
tained from a simple weighted sum of the individual prior
probability distributions because there is an interaction,
namely αβ = γ.
This is a simple example but it bears a formal simi-
larity to the situation in quantum mechanics where one
considers linear superpositions of eigenfunctions. In both
cases, difficulties arise with the usual composition of
probability distribution functions because of interaction
effects, usually function overlap in the case of quantum
mechanical systems, algebraic effects in the simple iter-
ated function system discussed here. The significance of
this example is that this demonstrates the failure of ad-
ditivity even in the case of a classical system with real
valued functions. Quantum mechanics is not necessary
for such non-Kolmogorovian effects to appear.
Failure of Bell’s Theorem
Let us now consider the following pair of single player
combinatorial games. They are not very interesting as
games but they illustrate a feature of games which is that
they can defeat the Bell inequality under certain condi-
tions. For this example consider a pair of games played
out on the previously defined 2 × 2 blocks a, b, c, d, one
game using the transformation α and the other γ. We
consider sequential game play, and we are interested in
the outcome following every two steps of play. As de-
scribed previously, Bell’s original theorem involves rela-
tionships among three correlation functions based upon
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spin measurements on a pair of entangled particles. In
this example we consider correlation functions based on
trajectories defined by repeated game play, with differ-
ent initial conditions replacing the different orientations
of measurement.
We consider three initial conditions, a, b, d. In the cor-
relations defined below, the first variable refers to the
game generated by α and the second to that generated
by γ. Measurements of a, b, c, d have defined values of
1, 1/2,−1/2,−1 respectively.
Play using α or γ yield distinct trajectories. Never-
theless when we restrict ourselves to two play games we
note that αα = id and γγ = id so that we always obtain
constant trajectories, namely just the initial condition.
Bell’s inequality takes the form
1 + E(b, c) ≧ |E(a,b) − E(a, c)|
Note that only the expectations values are important,
not the circumstances under which they were generated.
It is only important that the measurement values in di-
rections a,b be ±1. So long as we ensure that under two
conditions the measurement values also be ±1 then we
meet the essential mathematical requirements of Bell’s
Theorem. Clearly in this simple example if we choose
initial conditions a, d then we shall obtain measured ex-
pectation values of 1,−1 respectively. Choose for the
third initial condition the block b. Bell’s inequality takes
the form
1 + E(d, b) ≧ |E(a, d)− E(a, b)|
Since the play corresponds to simply applying the iden-
tity to the initial condition, the probability of observing
each initial condition is 1 as is the probability of observ-
ing the pair of initial conditions, so that the expectation
value of the measurement of the product becomes simply
the product of the measurements. Therefore calculations
of these correlations yields
1 + (−1)(1/2) ≧ |(1)(−1)− (1)(1/2)|
or
1− 1/2 = 1/2 ≧ | − 1− 1/2| = | − 3/2| = 3/2
which is clearly false. Thus we have a simple discrete,
classical system which nevertheless exhibits correlations
that violate the Bell inequality. The violation of the in-
equality holds for this special triple of initial conditions
just as the violation of Bell’s theorem in quantum me-
chanics occurs for certain measurement directions.
This model is intentionally simplistic. The point is to
demonstrate that the assumption that a classical dynam-
ical system must be describable by a Kolmogorov type
probability theory is not actually correct. This example,
while involving simple one player games, may also be un-
derstood as a deterministic dynamical system. As such
it is deterministic and local and there is no interaction
between the two systems. The coupling arises because of
the choice of initial conditions and the processes them-
selves. The coupling is not at the level of the individual
events but rather at the level of the dynamics generating
those events. It also demonstrates that the conclusion
from Bell’s theorem that only a deterministic nonlocal
hidden variable theory is capable of describing quantum
mechanical phenomena is not necessarily true. This ob-
servation is in keeping with Palmer, who showed that
an iterated function system may reproduce quantum me-
chanical spin statistics while still avoiding Bell’s theorem.
Palmer gets around Bell by showing that the necessary
correlation functions fail to exist. This simple example
shows that the theorem may be defeated directly. In situ-
ations in which the dynamics is generated by games (and
possibly iterated function systems as well), the probabil-
ity structure need not be Kolmogorov and consequently
it may be possible to defeat the Bell inequality.
Khrennikov summed up these insights, stating “Viola-
tion of Bell’s inequality is merely an exhibition of non-
Kolmogorovness of quantum probability, i.e. the impos-
sibility of representing all quantum correlations as corre-
lations with respect to a single Kolmogorov probability
space”[8, pg. 6]. Khrennikov has developed these ideas of
non-Kolgorovian probability in his Va¨xjo¨ model of con-
textual probability theory. The details of this approach
are not necessary here but it generalizes the addition for-
mula for quantum probabilities and applies this to classi-
cal events. What is important is that the most fundamen-
tal assumption of Bell that classical events must follow
the rules of Kolmogorovian probability theory is not true
in general and so the conclusions derived from Bell’s the-
orem related to the necessity of nonlocality in any hidden
variable model of quantum mechanics are also not uni-
versally valid. Inspired by these ideas we turn now to a
set of mathematical approaches which capture this idea
of non-Kolmogorovness in classical settings and so open
the door to realist quasi-local hidden variable models of
quantum mechanics.
PROCESS THEORY
Process is a construct well recognized in psychology
and biology, for example the emergence theories of Trofi-
mova [36] and Varela [37]. In physics the notion of pro-
cess generally refers to an interaction between entities
that unfolds in time. Processes may change certain dy-
namical parameters associated with continuous symme-
tries such as energy, position or momentum. Examples
of these include scattering, state transitions, capture and
emission. Processes may change certain discrete param-
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eters associated with intrinsic characteristics like charge,
charm, strangeness, lepton or baryon number. Creation,
annihilation and decay are examples of these. Conceptu-
ally, fundamental physical entities enter into or emerge
from various processes but their very existence is not
viewed as arising out of process.
The view of Whitehead stands in marked contrast.
Whitehead views reality as emerging out of a lower level
of reality consisting of actual occasions. Fundamental
physical entities are viewed as emergent configurations
of actual occasions. An analog lies in attempts in the
1980’s to model reality as a cellular automaton where
particles appeared as patterns manifesting over time on
the cellular automaton lattice [5]. Process theories, par-
ticularly the theory of Whitehead [9], possess several es-
sential features that need to be considered in creating a
representational system that expresses them.
1. The basic elements of experience, actual occasions,
have a richer character than is generally attributed
to elements of reality. Actual occasions possess a
dual character. On the one hand they form a fun-
damental component of the fabric of reality. On
the other hand, they serve as information for the
creation of subsequent actual occasions.
2. Process theory is a generative theory. The actual
occasions that form the essence of reality come into
existence through a process of prehension, in which
the information residue of prior occasions is inter-
preted and new occasions generated creatively in a
non-deterministic manner.
3. Actual occasions are transient in nature. They
arise, linger briefly and then fade away. In con-
trast to current physical thinking, process theory
asserts the existence of a transient ‘now’.
4. Essential to process is the idea of becoming. This is
subtly different from the notion of generation. For
example, an iterated function system generates a
trajectory by the repeated application of the func-
tion to a previous point: x, f(x), f(f(x)), How-
ever, the space upon which this function acts exists
a priori. A trajectory in the space is generated, the
space itself is not. In process theory, the space it-
self does not exist a priori, indeed it does not exist
at all except as an idealization in some mathemat-
ical universe. All that exists is a collection of ac-
tual occasions that are continually in the process
of becoming. An actual occasion has no existence
unless and until it is brought into existence through
the action of prehension. It subsequently fades into
non-existence and any future influence that it might
have arises solely through its representation in some
form of memory.
5. In process theory events are fundamentally dis-
crete, being comprised of vast numbers of actual
occasions. The perception of events as being con-
tinuous may well be a deeply ingrained illusion. Its
abstraction in mathematical form has given rise to
powerful analytical tools, so much so that continu-
ity has been reified as a property of space-time and
histories and entities. Process theory asserts that
entities and their motion are actually discrete and
their apparent continuity is again a consequence of
the process of idealization inherent in the formation
of an interpretation.
6. Actual occasions are held to be holistic entities. It
may be convenient for conceptual, descriptive or
analytical purposes to consider actual occasions as
consisting of individual ‘parts’, but this again con-
stitutes an idealization or contrivance. Each actual
occasion must be considered to be a whole unto it-
self and any information or influence attributed to
an actual occasion must be attributed to the actual
occasion as a whole and not to any of its supposed
parts. Any such parts must be considered to be
unobservable as must any presumed properties or
characteristics of these parts. Properties and char-
acteristics that may be observed by other actual
occasions must be attributed solely to the actual
occasion as a whole.
From a process perspective all matter would be viewed
as emergent, arising from the evolution of actual occa-
sions. These actual occasions would not be accessible
to material entities in much the way that mind is inca-
pable of sensing the actions of individual neurons, even
though mind is emergent from the actions of neurons.
Being emergent, the laws governing the behaviour of ac-
tual occasions need not be those of quantum mechanics,
though the behaviour of entities emerging at the lowest
spatiotemporal scales should obey those laws. Likewise,
entities emerging from these fundamental quantum enti-
ties need not obey the laws of quantum mechanics, or at
least quantum mechanical laws need not be relevant for
understanding their behaviour, just as the laws governing
the action of mind are not the same as the laws governing
the neurons giving rise to it. This is a common situation
in the theory of emergence. Although lower level enti-
ties may give rise to higher level entities, the relationship
between these two may be such that there is no one-
one correspondence between the behaviours at one level
and those at the other level, so that the laws govern-
ing the lower level become irrelevant for understanding
behaviour at the higher level.
There are two other aspects of process that deserve
mention. First of all, process has an inherently non local
character. A biological organism is an expression of a
vast array of processes but these processes are local only
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in a naive and superficial sense. The entities that partic-
ipate in these processes are distributed widely in space
and time. Mental processes cannot even be localized to
the brain as the body and the environment play impor-
tant roles. Secondly, the entities that participate in pro-
cess are often fungible. Although a whole organism may
not be fungible, its constituent molecules most certainly
are, and sometimes components are not even of the same
species as the organism, particularly in the case of diges-
tive processes. A board game such as Chess is a simple
example of a process. Although individual moves of chess
pieces are local, the choice of which piece to move on a
given play is inherently non local, though certain game
positions may favour local or non local choices. Chess is
fungible, so long as any replacement respects the current
arrangement of pieces. Chess can be played anywhere,
at any time, with almost any objects, real or virtual, so
long as a suitable correspondence is established between
the objects and their movements and their roles as chess
pieces. Processes in themselves exist in an abstract, as-
patial and atemporal world, while the actual occasions
that they generate manifest in space and time and bear
specific relations to one another that are interpreted as
properties.
PROCESS INTERPRETATION OF THE WAVE
FUNCTION
There are subtleties of dynamics that are not easily
captured by the standard functional analytic formula-
tion of quantum mechanics. Consider the issue of being
‘bound ’. Classically it is a fairly straightforward mat-
ter to determine whether a particle is bound to another
particle because the trajectory of the bound particle will
form a closed path with the binding particle lying in the
interior of the path. In quantum mechanics this is not so
straightforward since particles do not follow trajectories
that can be mapped. A free or a bound particle can, in
principle, be found anywhere in space. Its mere detection
says little about its dynamical state. A detailed determi-
nation of the shape of the wave function would help but
is unfeasible. Moreover a free particle could be stationary
and have a spherically symmetric wave function just like
a bound particle. The main difference is that the prob-
ability of the free particle being near the centre is fairly
large while for the bound particle is it fairly small. A
free particle can propagate but how does one distinguish
the random motion of a bound particle and the propa-
gation of a free particle, when both can appear more or
less anywhere at any time? Moreover, in the case of a
spherical potential, the potential extends throughout all
of space and so in considering when a free particle be-
comes bound it is not clear when exactly one is to apply
the bound equation and not the free particle equation. In
principle the free particle could become bound anywhere
and at any time. And if it is bound to one particle could
it not also become bound to another particle? To every
other particle? The equation describing the dynamics of
the particle must change between free and bound condi-
tions and so an additional consideration must come into
play to determine when this takes place. What is this
additional consideration and how does a particle ‘know’
when to apply it?
The classical interpretation of the wave equation is
that it provides a probability distribution for the po-
sition of the quantum system. More precisely it pro-
vides a probability distribution for a detection by a po-
sition measurement apparatus, said detection usually at-
tributed to the presence of a particle in that location
at that time. This is not a problem given an ensem-
ble view of the wave function, whereby repeated mea-
surements of an ensemble of identically created particles
are conducted and the probability distribution of those
measurements calculated. There are problems, however,
when one wishes to attribute the probability distribution
to a single particle or to attribute a physical reality to
the wave function much as one attributes reality to the
electromagnetic wave function. In the case of the lat-
ter there are demonstrable effects having an electric and
magnetic character which can be attributed to the elec-
tromagnetic wave so its reality is not really questioned
anymore. The Schro¨dinger wave functions are quite dif-
ferent in character. Although Aharonov and Vaidman
[35] have suggested that the wave function of a single
particle could be detected using quantum non-demolition
measurements, it is only certain statistical measures that
can be detected, not the wave function itself.
Consider again the situation of a particle in a spheri-
cal potential, this time in the bound state. If the particle
is in an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian, say being in en-
ergy level n, with angular momentum l and spin angular
momentum m, then the wave function takes the form
Ψnlm(r, θ, φ) = Ae
− i
ℏ
EntRnl(r)P
m
l (cos θ)e
imφ
where Rnl(r) is the radial wave function (real valued),
Pml is the associated Legendre polynomial (real valued)
and A the normalization constant.
The probability distribution for this particle is given
by
Ψ∗nlmΨnlm = A
2e
i
ℏ
EntRnl(r)P
m
l (cos θ)e
−imφ×
e−
i
ℏ
EntRnl(r)P
m
l (cos θ)e
imφ =
A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2
Now the Hamiltonian in this case is time independent
and so one would expect that the probability distribution
would also be time independent and that is indeed the
case.
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Consider now the case in which the particle is in a su-
perposition of adjacent energy levels. The wave function
is this case is given by
1√
2
Ψnlm +
1√
2
Ψ(n+1)l′m′ =
Ae−
i
ℏ
EntRnl(r)P
m
l (cos θ)e
imφ+
Be−
i
ℏ
En+1tR(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ)e
im′φ
The probability distribution in this case is given as
P (r, θ, φ) = (1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2+
Re{ABe− iℏ (En−En+1)tRnl(r)Pml (cos θ)×
R(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ)e
i(m−m′)φ} =
(1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2+
Re{ABe− iℏ (En−En+1)t−ℏ(m−m′)Rnl(r)Pml (cos θ)×
R(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ)} =
(1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2+
AB cos(− i
ℏ
(En−En+1)t−ℏ(m−m′))Rnl(r)Pml (cos θ)×
R(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ)
In this case even though the Hamiltonian remains time
independent the probability distribution function now ac-
quires a temporal fluctuation by virtue of an interaction
term between the two eigenstates. Thus one no longer
has a stationary probability distribution. However, the
time average of this probability distribution is
P ′(r, θ, φ) = (1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2
which is the usual probability distribution expected from
combining the individual distributions. The loss of sta-
tionarity would appear to make any attempt to deter-
mine this probability distribution experimentally either
difficult or impossible. Even in the case of a non demoli-
tion experiment it would be impossible to determine the
distribution without synchronizing position sampling to
the frequency of the fluctuation and without knowing the
phase delay, both of which would require measuring the
differences in energy levels and spin angular momenta
between the two states which would appear to require a
demolition experiment.
If one attempted to measure the probability distribu-
tion with a single particle this would have to be done at
a series of distinct times, say t1, . . . , tn. The functions
being sampled at each time would differ, being
(1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2+
AB cos(− i
ℏ
(En−En+1)t1−ℏ(m−m′))Rnl(r)Pml (cos θ)×
R(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ), . . . ,
(1/2)A2R2nl(r)(P
m
l (cos θ))
2+
(1/2)B2R2(n+1)l′(r)(P
m′
l′ (cos θ))
2+
AB cos(− i
ℏ
(En−En+1)tn−ℏ(m−m′))Rnl(r)Pml (cos θ)×
R(n+1)l′(r)P
m′
l′ (cos θ)
If one happened to be sampling at the same fre-
quency as the fluctuation, then one would obtain the
mean distribution shifted by a systematic drift term
cos(iℏ(m−m′))Rnl(r)Pml (cos θ)R(n+1)l′ (r)Pm
′
l′ (cos θ).
If one knew the phase delay one might offset it, obtain-
ing the average distribution. If one samples the times
uniformly and randomly, then these fluctuations would,
on average, cancel each other out, again leaving the av-
erage distribution. However, the average distribution is
not the wave function, since the fluctuating term is not
simply a random variation but rather an integral part
of the wave function. Indeed the mean wave function is
what would be expected from Kolmogorovian probabil-
ity theory, which we already know to be inconsistent with
quantum mechanics.
In this case we see that the only way in which the ac-
tual wave function can be detected is if it were possible
to carry out a series of quantum non-demolition exper-
iments on an ensemble of particles, not a single parti-
cle. One could not simply measure the frequency with
which particles appear since such a distribution would
actually have to be measured over time, and thus one
would not obtain the actual distribution but only a time
averaged version. The actual distribution would require
an ensemble of particles whose positions could be sam-
pled simultaneously at repeated times, the frequencies
being determined for each individual time. The fluctu-
ating distribution thus has meaning only in relation to
an ensemble of particles since it is only with an ensemble
that it can be measured at all. It is not at all clear how
attributing a probability distribution to a single particle
in this case would make any sense.
These considerations suggest problems in the interpre-
tation of the wave function, at least in so far as single
particles are concerned. For the most part, treating the
wave function as an expression of ensemble behaviour
is consistent with experiment as well being theoretically
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consistent. It admits the possibility, at least in principle,
of experimental verification. In the case of single parti-
cles, however, it appears no longer possible, in general,
to verify it experimentally. Suppose for the moment that
we consider the possibility that the probability interpre-
tation of the wave function is a consequence of the statis-
tical character of ensemble behaviour and that it simply
does not apply to single particles. What then might the
wave function represent?
These two considerations suggest that NRQM may
indeed be incomplete and that additional features are
needed. Suppose though that these additional factors
arise because the two distinct aspects of ultimate reality
- actual occasions and the processes that generate them
- were conflated when the original mathematical frame-
work of NRQM was developed. Formally, NRQM takes
many of the features of classical mechanics, particularly
its Hamiltonian formulation, and attempts to effect a
translation to a slightly more general mathematics - from
point set analysis to functional analysis. Process per se is
not explicitly considered in the functional analytic frame-
work. Perhaps it would be better to look for mathemati-
cal systems that are better equipped to represent process
and then see whether NRQM could be derived within this
setting. Indeed, Palmer has already shown that iterated
function systems may reproduce many of the essential
features of quantum mechanics, at least spin statistics
[32]. In this paper the focus is upon models based on
certain types of combinatorial games.
Suppose that the wave function actually describes in-
formation about the process responsible for the genera-
tion of a single particle. Suppose further that the prob-
ability interpretation arises in an emergent manner in
the context of a statistical ensemble of particles. Note
that in most quantum mechanical formulas, particularly
in path integral formulations and in quantum field the-
ory, the wave function enters into the Lagrangian, usu-
ally coupled either to itself or to the wave function of
another particle. Suppose, therefore, that the wave func-
tion describes some kind of ‘strength’ of the generating
process. Different processes would then couple through
these different process strengths. Positional probability
arises merely when a fundamental particle couples to a
position measurement device, and that turn out to be
a fairly basic coupling dependent upon a term of the
form Ψ∗Ψ. In this sense the probability aspect is not
an intrinsic feature of the wave function but rather an
emergent feature arising out of the interaction between
the particle and the measurement device. Given such an
interpretation, a single particle could indeed possess a
physical wave function, which describes not the particle
per se but rather the process that generates the events
that we ultimately interpret as a particle. Contradictions
arise because we attribute the wave function incorrectly
to the particle rather than to the process.
Suppose for the moment that we allow the possibility
that the phenomenon that we term particle is not a thing
in itself but rather is an emergent manifestation of some-
thing more primitive; that a particle is generated and
that the links between occurrences of a particle possess
an informational aspect. Suppose further that the actual
occurrences that are the direct manifestations of these
processes occur on a spatio-temporal scale much smaller
than that of the particles being generated, so small that
they would be inherently unobservable to any usual ma-
terial entity. Any such occurrence, being so small would
not be resolvable, and so would appear to any material
entity as a rather ill-defined or fuzzy object. Let us fur-
ther suppose that we represent this fuzzy primitive entity
as a spatio-temporal transient. As a simple example, sup-
pose we let each such transient have the functional form
(in one dimension)
sin(σx − kn)
(σx − kn)
Each such occasion manifests its process. The strength
of this process is given by the value of the wave function
for the process attributed to the peak of the transient.
Therefore at each point the process contributes a tran-
sient of the form
Ψ(kn/σ)
sin(σx − kn)
(σx− kn)
An observable event becomes a summation over a mul-
titude of these primitive events. Give an observation at
point z, we associate a set Iz of points of the form knσ
such that z is an element of the real interval I˜z formed by
filling in the gaps in Iz. To the point z we can associate
a function
Ψz(x) =
∑
kj/σ∈Iz
Ψ(kj/σ)
sin(σx − kj)
(σx − kj)
Assume a collection of observations {z1, . . . , zn} such
that the corresponding intervals I˜z1 , . . . , I˜zn are disjoint.
Then by the Shannon-Weiner-Kotel’nikov theorem, as
the number of observations increases, the resulting sum
of contributions will converge to a function Ψ(x) =∑
z Ψz(x) defined on the entire real line. This interpo-
lated function becomes the wave function of the particle.
The particle thus moves discretely but due to the small
scale we only observe and interact with the interpolation
- the wave. In this way a particle has both wave-like and
particle-like aspects but there is no contradiction and no
paradox - it is merely a question of scale.
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GAME THEORY
Combinatorial Games
A combinatorial game is a mathematical abstraction of
games that are commonly played in real life such as Tic-
Tac-Toe, Dots and Boxes, Checkers, Chess, Go and so
on. Combinatorial games involve players who carry out
moves in an alternating manner in the absence of random
elements and in the presence of perfect information. The
end of play is generally heralded by an inability of the
players to make a move, the last player able to move being
declared the winner. Combinatorial games are to be dis-
tinguished from the games usually studied in economics
and biology in which players may move simultaneously
in the presence of complete or incomplete information,
in which there may be random elements, and in which
the end of play is measured relative to some optimality
criterion applied across all possible game plays.
The formal theory of combinatorial games began with
Sprague-Grundy in the 1930’s but became a mature
branch of mathematics in the 1970’s with the work of
John H. Conway and others [12]. A close cousin, the
Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game, has been used extensively in
mathematical logic and model theory to construct repre-
sentations of formal systems. The focus here is on Con-
way’s theory, which has its most developed expression in
the study of short determinate two player partisan games,
though research continues to expand the theory to long
indeterminate multi-player games with generalized out-
comes. Short deterministic two player partisan games
form a partially ordered Abelian group. Moreover, there
exists a subgroup of such games that can be interpreted
as numbers and constitute the expanded field of surreal
numbers. The same group admits additional elements
that have an interpretation as infinitesimals, extending
the field to include elements of non-standard analysis.
In the combinatorial games discussed below, it is as-
sumed that there are two players, Left and Right, who
move alternately, possess possible moves that are dis-
tinct from one another, and possess complete information
about the state of the game during any play. Moreover,
the nature of the game is such that play is guaranteed
to end after a finite number of plays. The state of the
game at any play can be fully determined. The options
for a given player from a particular state of the game are
simply the set of all states of the game that can follow a
single play of the game by that player. There will be a
distinct set of Left options and of Right options. Go is
an example of such a game. The definition of a com-
binatorial game does, however, include one additional
assumption, which is that the last player to play wins.
Many games do not satisfy these conditions but are still
capable of analysis within this framework. The partic-
ular definition used was chosen because of its general-
ity and the depth of its mathematical results, but there
have since been many generalizations to include trans-
finite play, loopy play, mise`re play, play with different
outcome determinants, and multiple players.
The play of a game begins with some initial state (po-
sition or configuration). A player moves, resulting in a
new position. The other player then moves, again re-
sulting in a new position, and the process repeats. The
complete play of the game is thus described as a (finite)
sequence of such positions, terminating when no further
play is possible. For convenience we can catalogue all
possible sequences of game play by constructing a game
tree. Denote the players as Left and Right. Starting from
a particular position, we arrange below and to the left,
all possible positions that can be achieved by a move on
the part of Left. Similarly we arrange below and to the
right, all possible positions that can be achieved by a
move on the part of Right. The process is then repeated
for this new level of game and so on until no more po-
sitions can be achieved. A particular complete play of
the game will correspond to a path down the game tree,
beginning with the initial position and then proceeding
to successive positions by alternating along left and right
steps.
The formal definition of a combinatorial game is con-
ceptually quite confusing at first but it possesses great
generality. It is inherently recursive and most construc-
tions in combinatorial game theory arise through some
(implicit) form of bootstrapping or through top-down in-
duction. The technique is powerful and worth the mental
effort to master it. Since each game begins with a game
position we can define a game by that initial position.
Play then becomes a sequence of games rather than a
sequence of positions. Moreover each position has asso-
ciated with it a specific set of positions obtainable by a
move of Left, termed Left options, and another specific
set of positions obtainable by a move of Right, termed
Right options. Since the subsequent play of the game
will depend only upon these sets of options a position
may just as well be equated with these two sets of op-
tions. Therefore we associate any position P with its
set of Left options PL and its set of Right options PR.
Now for the confusing part. Taking each position to be a
game, each set of options can be viewed as a set of games.
Hence we define a game G = {GL|GR} where GL and GR
are sets of games. A game has an alternative definition
in terms of its game tree, which represents the possible
moves for each player from any given game position.
The fundamental theorem of combinatorial games
states that given a game G with players L and R such
that L moves first, either L can force a win moving first,
or R can force a win moving second, but not both.
This results in four distinct outcome classes for games.
These are
1. Positive: L can force a win regardless of who goes
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first
2. Negative: R can force a win regardless of who goes
first
3. Zero: The second player to play can force a win
4. Fuzzy: The first player to play can force a win
Positive, negative and zero games form the class of
surreal numbers under addition as defined below. The
fuzzy games form the class of infinitesimals. Positivity-
negativity is a symmetry operation given by reversal of
the roles of Left and Right. For non-partizan games (the
Left and Right options are always the same), there are
only two outcome classes, fuzzy and zero.
The formal definitions are [12]:
1. A combinatorial gameG is given as {GL|GR} where
GL and GR are sets of games
2. The sum of games G+H is defined as {GL+H,G+
HL|GR +H,G+HR}
3. The negative of a game G, is defined as −G =
{−GR| −GL}
4. For two games G,H , equality is defined by G = H
if for all games X , G+X has the same outcome as
H +X
5. For two games, G,H , isomorphism is defined as
G ≈ H if G and H have the same game tree
6. For two games, G,H , we say that G ≥ H if for
all games X , Left wins G+X whenever Left wins
H +X
7. A game G is a number if all elements of GL and
GR are numbers and gL < G < gR for all gL ∈ GL
and gR ∈ GR .
For any integer n, a game in which Left has n free
moves is assigned the number n, while any game in which
Right has n free moves is assigned the number −n. In
the case of short games, the number assigned will be a
dyadic rational, i.e. an integer of the formm/2n for some
integers n,m. The number of the sum of two games that
are numbers is the sum of the numbers of the individ-
ual games. Multiplication and division can be defined on
games that are numbers in such a way that these games
form a field, the surreal numbers. Surreal numbers that
are non dyadic rationals arise through a consideration
of games of transfinite length and include the rationals,
the reals and the ordinals. They may be generated us-
ing techniques similar to that of Dedekind cuts for the
creation of the reals.
Games can be generated recursively starting with the
simplest game 0 = {|}. This is the game with no options
at all. Call this day 0. At day 1, one may construct four
possible games, {|}, {|{|}}, {{|}|}, and {{|}|{|}} denoted
0, -1, 1 and * respectively. There are 36 games at day
2, 1474 games at day 3 and at day 4 somewhere between
3× 1012 and 10434 games [41].
If tokens are added to these games then it becomes
possible to form a vector space, and with a suitable no-
tion of commutation, a Lie algebra. The significance of
this it that is now becomes possible, at least in principle,
to use token combinatorial games as representations of
Lie algebras, and thus of the fundamental processes of
nature vis-a`-vis their description in the standard model
of quantum field theory.
Game sums and products
One distinct advantage of combinatorial game theory
is that it admits many different kinds of linearity, that
is, many different kinds of sum may be defined. In ev-
ery case, however, a key feature of a sum is that on any
given play the player whose turn it is may play either in
G or in H . Thus play alternates between the two games
but not necessarily in a sequential manner. The combi-
natorial or disjoint sum defined in the previous section
describes games that may be thought of as being played
out on different boards. The interpretation of G +H is
that on a given play a move in one game will have no
effect upon play in the other game. Let us assume, how-
ever, that the distinct games are being played out on the
same board, albeit with different pieces or tokens. The
disjoint sum may still be defined in this case so long as
play of one game has no effect upon play of the other
game. An example might be where tokens from different
games may be applied to a single location on the board
without affecting one another in any way. Another oc-
curs when play is localized to non-overlapping regions of
the board. In physics an example of such a situation is in
the dynamics of bosons, where multiple bosons may oc-
cuy the same spatio-temporal location without affecting
one another in any manner.
We may define an exclusive sum of G,H denoted
G+ˆH . In the exclusive sum, no move of G may occur
on a site occupied by a piece of H and vice-versa, other-
wise there are no restrictions on game play. There is a
weak kind of interaction present between these two games
but play of one game is not determined by the other,
merely constrained sometimes and at some locations. It
is a rather passive kind of interaction and there is no real
interchange of information between the two games. Phys-
ically speaking, there is no exchange of energy between
the games. An example in physics of such a situation
is in the dynamics of fermions, which are not allowed to
occupy identical states.
A third sum may be define when certain moves of G
influence which moves of H may subsequently be played
and vice-versa. In this case, information from the play of
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one game has an effect upon the subsequent play of the
other game and so an exchange of relevant information
indeed takes place. Play may or may not be exclusive. In
physics, the situation of a binding of two particles would
be describable by such a sum. We denote an interactive
sum by G⊕H , but understand that this does not define
a fixed form of game play. Rather, its interpretation will
depend upon the particular games and their context. At
best one can say that it will be an element from a set
of possible forms of game play. Note that technically an
exclusive sum is really a form of interactive sum but it
is singled out because of its ubiquity and the fact that
it represents more of an avoidance of interaction than
interaction.
These different sums may be understood in terms of the
game tree. The formula for G+H shows that the game
tree is built up in a rather complicated manner. Let UG
denote the set of all game positions for G. Likewise for
UH . Then U(G+H) = (UG)(UH). Next one adds edges
as follows. For any given game position g, let TGL(g) de-
note the subtree consisting of all subsequent left moves in
G with similar notation for right moves and for H . Then
from any combined position gh the set of subsequent
edges is given as TGL(g)h∪gTHL(h)∪TGR(g)h∪gTHR(h).
In the exclusive sum G+ˆH , the game tree is given as the
game tree of G+H minus all edges and positions corre-
sponding to G plays and H plays appearing on the same
board locations. The game tree G ⊕H will be a proper
subtree of the either the tree for G+H or for G+ˆH .
In addition we have several different notions for the
product of two games. The combinatorial product de-
fined above involves non simultaneous play and corre-
sponds to the arithmetic product when restricted to
games that are also surreal numbers. In these additional
products the key notion is that on any given play the
player whose turn it is must play both G and H simul-
taneously. In the direct product G ⊗ H , G and H are
played simultaneously but freely. In the exclusive direct
product, G⊗ˆH , G and H are played simultaneously but
never on the same board site, which will in general neces-
sitate some rule for breaking such moves. Finally there
is a notion of an interactive product, G⊠H which again
corresponds to simultaneous play but where moves are
no longer free for each game but are restricted or even
coupled to varying degrees giving rise to a collection of
different games.
Sums would appear to best describe the generation of
particles in superpositions of eigenstates since we want
only a single informon to manifest at any step of game
play. Products would better describe the situation of
multiple particles since they allow multiple games to be
played simultaneously, corresponding to the manifesting
of multiple particles simultaneously. However there may
be situations in which the generation of particles must
occur sequentially and in such cases sums must be used.
That might occur in the case of fermions since identical
states are to be avoided. Since no such constraint applies
to multiple bosons, they presumably may be described by
products.
Combinatorial Token Games
The idea of a combinatorial game with tokens is used
extensively so a few words are in order. Most combinato-
rial games are played on some kind of board using pieces
or some kinds of marks which distinguish moves. Typi-
cal examples would be Chess, Checkers, Go, Hackenbush,
Tic-Tac-Toe. A token is simply some kind of object that
is placed on the board and which conveys information rel-
evant to the play of the game. For example, chess pieces,
by their association to specific roles, determine the kinds
of moves available to them. Tokens may have mathemat-
ical or physical properties in their own right which can be
useful to the play of the game. In specifying a combina-
torial game with tokens we are considering situations in
which tokens are either created or modified in the course
of game play and the operations that may be performed
upon these tokens enables one to construct combinations
of games. The reality games to be described below are
played out on a causal manifold and tokens take the form
of certain functions or vectors. Various operations may
be defined on these tokens and used to define new games
or to combine games.
For example given a complex number w and a token
game P if we lay down a token φ in P then in the game wP
we lay down a token w(φ), where some property of the
token is modified by w. This enables the sums and prod-
ucts defined above to be expanded into more complex
algebraic forms. In many cases, the number of tokens
in a token game is constrained to some fixed value inde-
pendent of the length of play. This is certainly true of
a game like Chess. In other cases the number of tokens
is determined solely by the possible length of play. In
either case in a game G formed as a sum of subgames Gi
according to G =
∑
iwiGi one may interpret the term
wiGi to mean that the fraction of tokens assigned to the
game Gi is |wi|2f(n) where f(n) is the total number of
tokens (as a function of length of game play n). In some
situations such as the reality game played below, both
interpretations may hold simultaneously, so that wi may
modify both the number of tokens and some property of
the tokens.
Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse´ Games
Games may beused to analyze the structure of mathe-
matical theories and to compare structures within these
theories. A brief digression to explore the idea of an
Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse´ will set the stage for the use of games
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[13] appears in the study of mathematical logic where it is
used to determine whether two structures may be viewed
as expressing the same set of properties from the per-
spective of a specific logical theory. Mathematical logic
consists of a collection of formal sentences constructed
according to specified rules from an alphabet consisting
of constant symbols, variable symbols, relational sym-
bols, quantifiers and logical connectives. A sentence in
formal logic has a counterpart in natural language but its
formal nature makes it amenable to mathematical anal-
ysis. There are in addition a collection of rules which
determine how one may create new sentences out of a
pre-existing collection of sentences and which ensure that
the new collection remains logically consistent and coher-
ent. These are formal analogues of the laws of deduction
taught in courses in philosophy and reasoning.
A first order language L consists of a collection of sym-
bols having different interpretations and formed into fi-
nite length strings according to a predetermined set of
rules. The rules are designed to maintain consistency in
the interpretation of these formulas or sentences. The ba-
sic symbols are constants a, b, c, . . . , variables x, y, z, . . . ,
functions F,G,H, . . . , relations R,S, T, . . . , =, and the
logical quantifiers ¬, ∨, →, ↔, ∀, ∃. A term consists of a
constant, variable, or function of constants and/or vari-
ables. A closed term has no variables. An atomic formula
consists of s= t where s and t are terms or a relation of
terms. A formula consists of a finite application of the
logical quantifiers to a collection of atomic formulas. A
variable is free if it is not within the scope of some quan-
tifier. A sentence is a formula having no free variables.
A theory is a collection of sentences. A model of a theory
is a mathematical structure such that each constant in
the theory corresponds to an element of the structure,
each function and relation of the theory corresponds to
a function and relation of the structure, and such that
every sentence of the theory may be interpreted in the
model and found to be true.
Often one wishes to understand the explanatory power
of a theory. Does a theory, for example, describe every-
thing about a particular model or are some features left
unmentioned? Is the theory powerful enough to distin-
guish between specific models? An answer to the latter
question can often be obtained through the play of an
Ehrenfuecht-Fraisse´ game.
Suppose that one is given two mathematical structures
A,B, and one wishes to determine whether or not these
two structures can be distinguished using a theory ex-
pressed in the language of first order logic. Assume that
there are two players I, II and furthermore assume that
play occurs for exactly n moves, where n is fixed in ad-
vance.
The game play is extraordinarily simple. Player I
moves first and is free to choose any element they like
from either A or B. Player II then moves and may pick
any element they like but only from the structure that
Player I did not choose from. Play is repeated but with
the caveat that at each step each player must choose a
point that has not already been chosen. If there are no
such elements to choose from then they simply forfeit
their turn. Play continues in this way until a total of n
steps have been played.
At the end of play one determines which of the two
players has won the game. Let ai be the element of struc-
ture A selected at the i-th move (whether by Player I or
II) and let bi be the element of structure B selected at
the i-th move. One says that Player II wins the game if,
whenever a relation R holds in A for a sequence of ele-
ments ai, aj , . . . , an then it also holds for the correspond-
ing elements bi, bj , . . . , bn of B. Otherwise one says that
Player I wins.
A strategy is a systematic procedure which tells a
player how to move following a particular series of game
plays. For example, one could simply pick an element at
random. Usually one is interested in strategies that are
deterministic, meaning that given a particular sequence
of points selected in previous game plays there is a unique
point to be selected on the current play. Such a strat-
egy is called deterministic since the choices are fixed in
advance. If Player II possesses a deterministic strategy
which guarantees a win in n plays against Player I no
matter how Player I plays, then we say that the game is
determined and write A ≈n B.
Returning to theory, given a formal sentence φ and
a model A, we write A ⊢ φ if one can find elements,
constants and relations in A corresponding to those in φ
so that the precise relations expressed by φ are satisfied
by these corresponding relations in A. If for every logical
formula φ having at most n quantifiers A ⊢ φ if and only
if B ⊢ φ, then we write A ≡n B.
The power of Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games arises from
the fact that A ≈n B if and only if A ≡n B. The game is
often much easier to use to solve the logic problem than
are logic tools alone. Thus games may be used heuristi-
cally without any ontological attribution being made as
to the nature and status of the players.
Generative Games and Forcing
Another important question facing logicians is to de-
termine when a logical theory actually possesses a model
and to exhibit such a structure. One of the most fa-
mous examples of this was the continuum hypothesis.
This question concerns the sizes of sets and in partic-
ular whether the set of real numbers and the set of all
subsets of natural numbers have the same size (cardinal-
ity). Cohen showed that is was possible to find models
of set theory which extended the usual set theory, one of
which satisfied the continuum hypothesis and one which
did not. In this way he solved a long standing founda-
tional problem in mathematical logic. The technique that
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he used to create such models involves a method called
forcing [13].
The details are very technical but begin with the idea
of a notion of consistency. A notion of consistency en-
ables one to determine which theories actually possess
models. Not all theories possess models. For example,
the theory given by the single sentence (a = b)∧¬(a = b)
has no model. Theories can be built up step by step pro-
vided that at each step one maintains consistency among
the statements of the theory. This follows from the com-
pactness theorem which states that if every finite subset
of a theory T possesses a model then the theory T itself
possesses a model. Building a theory step by step in this
manner requires some notion of consistency. Formally, a
notion of consistency N is a collection of sets of sentences
of L which satisfy certain rules of logical consistency. For
example, if p ∈ N and t is any closed term in L, then
p ∪ {t = t} is in N . As an example involving a sentence,
suppose that ¬(φ ∧ σ) lies in some subset p ⊂ N . Then
either p ∪ {φ} or p ∪ {σ} lies in N , but not both. There
are seventeen such rules whose details are not necessary
here (see [13]). Each element p ∈ N is called a condition.
The idea is that each condition consists of a collection of
formal sentences that are logically consistent. The im-
portant point is that if N is a notion of consistency and
p is a condition of N , then p has a model.
This is proven by virtue of a game. Assume that there
are two players, I and II. The number of plays of the game
is fixed in advance and described by some infinite ordi-
nal number. The players alternate in making a move,
Player I playing first. The goal of the game is to con-
struct an increasing set of conditions possessing a model
at each stage, and then forcing the final union of all of
these conditions to have a model as well. At each stage
of the construction different tasks are assigned according
to each of the seventeen rules and these tasks are per-
formed in such a way that only a finite number of new
elements are added to the previously constructed condi-
tion. For example, one task might be as follows: given
some condition p constructed up to this point, one selects
a closed term t and, if it is not already present in p, one
adds t = t to p. Similarly, suppose that p has already
been constructed and that the formula ¬(φ ∧ σ) lies in
p. Then this task might be to add either φ or σ, but not
both. Whenever a limit ordinal is reached one simply
assigns it the condition formed by taking the union over
all previously constructed conditions. The tasks are each
repeated a sufficient number of times to ensure that at
the end of the construction no possible moves have been
left undone. One possible strategy is to assume that a
sufficient number of steps are carried out at each stage of
the construction so as to parse at least once through the
collection of all possible instances of all possible rules. Of
course that will in general amount to a transfinite number
of tasks to be performed at each stage of the construction
and possibly a transfinite number of stages to complete
the construction. That this procedure works is due to
the recursive nature of the ordinals upon which this in-
ductive process depends. Additional constraints may be
placed on the choices made at each step. Finally some
criterion is established which determines who wins the
game. In other words the set of all possible sequences of
play is partitioned into two disjoint subsets, one consist-
ing of all wins for Player I and the other for all possible
wins for Player II.
One begins with a particular first order language L and
enlarges L to form a new language L(W ) by adding a set
W of new constants, called witnesses. A notion of forcing
for L(W ) is a notion of consistency N which satisfies the
following two conditions:
1. if p is a condition inN and t a closed term (meaning
no variables) in L(W ) and c is a witness which does
not appear in either p or t, then p ∪ {t = c} lies in
N
2. at most only finitely many witnesses appear in any
p ∈ N
Let us restrict ourselves to games in which there are
only a countable number of steps. Let P be some prop-
erty that we would like our model to possess. One in-
troduces witnesses and atomic formulae describing the
expression of the property. We allow players I and II to
alternate play as above, carrying out all of the necessary
tasks and incorporating these witnessed formulae into the
notion of consistency. If at the end of play the union of
the chain of created conditions has property P then we
say that Player II wins. If Player II has a strategy which
enables them to win no matter how Player I plays, then
the property P is said to be N -enforceable.
The importance of forcing is that it allows us to build
up a structure step by step using a particular kind of
game and ensure that it possesses a particular property.
The game approach is not only simpler in many cases
than the axiomatic approach but it possesses the gener-
ative character that we seek for any model based on pro-
cess theory. A more general technique for constructing
classes of mathematical structures using games is pre-
sented in Hirsch and Hodgkinson [14].
ARCHETYPAL DYNAMICS
Although information has been considered to play a
significant role in governing the behaviour of organisms
for nearly a century, it is only recently that ideas of infor-
mation began to appear in the physical literature based
upon the connection between information and entropy
as proposed by Shannon and Weaver [15], which actually
refers to the capacity for information and not its content.
Ironically, information became a focus of interest only
after it was stripped of any meaning. The program of
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archetypal dynamics is an attempt to provide a concep-
tual framework for studying the role of meaning laden
information across disciplinary boundaries, particularly
in those situations in which emergent phenomena appear.
It postulates that the various entities of reality arise from
and exist within particular conditions, that interactions
among themselves and with the larger environment ex-
hibit patterns, consistencies and constraints, all of which
admit an effective conceptualization termed a semantic
frame. The semantic frame gives meaning to the funda-
mental ontological questions of who, what, when, where,
how and why. The semantic frame gives meaning to the
entities and events and it is presumed that interactions
between and with these entities are governed by flows of
information whose meaning is imparted by the semantic
frame.
In Archetypal Dynamics [11], the behaviour of entities
is held to be determined by salient, meaning laden infor-
mation, which each entity detects and to which each en-
tity responds according to its nature. The saliency of in-
formation is determined by each entity itself and is a con-
sequence of its internal dynamics. Salience is considered
to be a precursor to actual meaning. Salience is manifest
in the phenomenon of transient induced global response
synchronization (TIGoRS), in which an entity is capable
of forming a differentiated pattern of responses in reac-
tion to distinct patterns. Those patterns that induce the
greatest convergence among responses are termed salient.
A related concept is that of compatibility, first introduced
by Trofimova in her pioneering studies of emergent mod-
els of dynamical networks termed ensembles with variable
structures (EVS), and used to determine when agents en-
ter into the formation of dynamical linkages [40].
The Fundamental Triad of archetypal dynamics refers
to realisations (the entities comprising the aspect of re-
ality under consideration), interpretations (the semantic
frames used by these entities or an observer to guide be-
haviours and interactions - exemplars of which are termed
archetypes) and representations (the formal, linguistic
or symbolic systems used to describe the realisation-
interpretation relationship).
Representations have generally taken the form of ex-
planatory narratives, archetypal imagery, or mathemati-
cal models. The apparent success of many mathemat-
ical models, particularly in the physical sciences, has
sometimes led to the belief that the mathematical de-
pictions or descriptions of reality actually are reality.
This reification hides the fact that these mathemati-
cal models are idealizations of reality. From the stand-
point of archetypal dynamics these mathematical theo-
ries constitute an interpretation of reality and particular
mathematical models form archetypes. These archetypes
are ideals to which reality may sometimes form a close
approximation under particular conditions and circum-
stances. They are not reality. In the real world there is
no infinity of entities, nor infinite volumes, temperatures,
energies or masses. Nevertheless, under particular con-
ditions some aspects of reality may behave in ways that
closely mimic the idealization. Usually these conditions
are those in which fluctuations of certain properties or
the effects of extraneous influences or scales can be min-
imized for at least the duration of observations. Under
such conditions one may think of reality as a finite ap-
proximation to the idealization (archetype) or conversely,
the archetype as an infinite limit idealization of the real-
ity.
Archetypal dynamics explicitly distinguishes between
reality (realisation) and archetype (interpretation) and
emphasizes the effective nature of the interpretation by
taking notice of the particular conditions under which the
semantic frame associated with the interpretation pro-
vides an effective description and interpretation of real-
ity. Archetypal dynamics asserts that all physical theo-
ries, indeed all theories whatsoever, are at best effective
theories, which hold under particular sets of conditions
and interactions and demonstrate diminishing efficacy as
these constraints are progressively violated. Even the
most universal of physical laws come into question un-
der conditions in which the symmetries underlying their
existence fail to hold, or at extremes of scale where cer-
tain assumptions such as the continuity or existence of
space-time come into question.
Rather than seeking a universal theory of everything,
archetypal dynamics sees the world as being governed by
a kaleidoscope of effective theories that interact with one
another at the condition boundaries. Meaning becomes
the relevant currency of exchange but meaning applies
only conditionally and creativity arises in those regions
where one set of conditions gives way to another. Emer-
gence is viewed as a fundamental aspect of reality, with
entities arising out of a co-creative interplay between re-
alisation and interpretation, which serves to stabilize the
conditions for their existence and persistence.
In the archetypal dynamics perspective reality is al-
ways creative and in flux. Entities are conditional and
therefore transient in nature. Entities, information, and
meaning come into existence, persist, and fade away.
There is a notion in the physical literature of a law of
conservation of information but this is a bizarre idea de-
rived from the unitary evolution of quantum systems and
which certainly does not apply to meaning laden infor-
mation. The idealizations that represent meaning can be
thought of as existing in some Platonic universe but their
applicability to reality fluctuates as the necessary condi-
tions pass into and out of existence. The metaphysics of
archetypal dynamics stands in contrast to the determinis-
tic world view that has dominated the physical sciences.
It posits a reality that is always in the process of be-
coming, that is always changing, that is fundamentally
transient.
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INTERPOLATION THEORY
Interest in the use of interpolation theory was inspired
by the work of Kempf [38] who used interpolation the-
ory to provide a bridge between discrete and continu-
ous representations of space-time and quantum fields. In
physics, the state of a system is most commonly repre-
sented by a vector, defined over some field, usually the
reals or complex numbers, together with an inner prod-
uct, and having finite or countable components. These
components are defined relative to a basis, which consists
of a collection of vectors, none of which can be expressed
as a sum of the others (independence). The number of
vectors in the basis gives the dimension of the vector
space. The components of a vector v are given by the
inner product of v with the different vectors vi that con-
stitute the basis, i.e. vi =< v,vi >. The significance
of the basis is that we can write each vector as a unique
sum v =
∑
i vivi =
∑
i < v,vi > vi .
In classical mechanics each vector specifies a particu-
lar measurable property of the system, such as position
or momentum. In quantum mechanics each vector is in-
finite dimensional and is usually interpreted as giving a
probability distribution from which the distribution of
measurable properties may be obtained.
In quantum mechanics the components vi of such a de-
composition do not provide the results of any measure-
ment directly. It is only the vector as a whole which can
be ascribed a measurement outcome. Such vectors must
therefore be treated holistically and do not represent any
kind of generation or evolution.
The decomposition of vectors into a sum of basis vec-
tors is a powerful technique mathematically which ex-
plains its widespread usage. But the notion of indepen-
dence required to define a basis turns out to be too strong
for many applications. This approach treats the vector
space and basis vectors as having a prior existence and
in the standard Fourier series approach the coefficients
are defined as integrals over the base space of the basis
functions. This may work in a static universe frame-
work but certainly not in a process framework in which
space-time is being generated. If one is to remain faith-
ful to and consistent with the generative approach, then
another method of generating functions is needed. Fortu-
nately there is an alternative to the basis representation
of vectors which is more general and which does permit
a generative interpretation.
The simplest such approach is provided by the
theory of function interpolation and in particular,
by the Whittaker-Shannon-Kotelnikov Theorem (WSK
Theorem)[16]. The idea is to begin with a sampling of a
function f at a countable set of points xk and from the
sampled values f(xk) attempt to reconstruct the original
function. The theorem originated in signal theory and
versions are used today in the digitization and recon-
struction of audio-visual signals. As it stands the idea
is too vague since an infinite number of functions can be
constructed from any countable set of values. In signal
theory the normal way to limit this plethora is to re-
strict consideration to entire functions lying in L2(R) or
L2(C) which are band limited, meaning that their Fourier
transforms are non-zero within a bounded interval of fre-
quency space, usually [−σ, σ]. The interpolated function
is constructed as a sum over the sampled values of the
form
f(x) =
∑
k
f(xk)Gk(x, xk)
Unlike the basis construction, the coefficients of this
expansion do represent actual values of the function
at the sampled points. In this representation one can
think of the function as being constructed from a dis-
crete set of events, namely the samples at the points
{x1, . . . , xk, . . .}. Each event is interpreted as a func-
tion f(xk)Gk(x, xk) and these are then superimposed to
obtain the final function. The utility of this is that each
actual occasion may now be interpreted as a continuous
function which, unlike the occasion itself which is local-
ized in space-time, now extends throughout the entire
space-time. The functions of physics may now be seen as
idealizations in which the number of samples is infinite
and past, present and future information persists indefi-
nitely. One may think of the function as being generated
through the incorporation of ever more points into the
construction and these points may be considered as tem-
poral, spatial, or spatio-temporal as one likes. At first
glance this might suggest that the past must persist into
the future in order for these functions to be constructed
but as they are merely interpretations of experience it is
only necessary that information concerning the past per-
sist in the present moment so that each current actual
occasion is capable of generating an appropriate inter-
pretation. Such information is already encoded in each
actual occasion in the form of its content. Thus one may
think of the function as being generated from the contin-
ual creation of actual occasions through the persistence
of information residues.
The simplest interpolation models are those in which
the functions Gk(x, xk) are all derived from a single tem-
plate function G(x). The simplest means of doing so is
through the use of a translation operator Tk so that one
may write
Gk(x, xk) = TkG(x) = G(x − xk)
One may then write the original equation in the form
f(x) =
∑
k
f(xk)TkG(x)
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where one may more easily consider f to be con-
structed as a sum of primitive events each of the form
f(xk)TkG(x).
The Whittaker-Shannon-Kotelnikov theorem asserts
that if f lies in L2(R) and its Fourier components lie
within the range 0 to W for some frequency W (band
limited), and if we sample the function at a (infinite) set
of discrete times 1/2W seconds apart, then we can write
f(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
f(n/2W ) sinpi(2Wt− n)/pi(2Wt− n)
This series is in fact both absolutely and uniformly
convergent on compact sets. This is a stronger result
than for the usual Fourier series representations.
Writing sinc(x) = sin(x)/x we can rewrite the formula
above in the following form:
f(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
f(n/2W )sinc(pi(2Wt− n)) =
=
∞∑
n=−∞
f(n/2W )Tn/2Wpisinc(pi(2Wt))
where Tnf(x) = f(x− n).
Of course this will converge to the original function
only in the case that one has a sampling over an infinite
collection of points. In reality one will have only a finite
sample to work with and so there will be errors arising
from the undersampling. There are several results deal-
ing with the effect of these truncation errors but the sim-
plest is perhaps the earliest discovered. Sampling over
2N + 1 points, we define the truncation error TNf(t) to
be
TNf(t) = f(t)−
N∑
n=−N
f(n/2W )
sinpi(2Wt− n)
pi(2Wt− n)
Let σ = 2Wpi , −T ≤ t ≤ T , 0 < △t < (1/σ) and
E =
∫∞
∞ |F (ω)|2dω where F (ω) is the Fourier transform
of f(t). E is called the total energy of f . Then
|TNf(t)| = ((
√
2)/pi)E|sin(pit/△t)|
√
(T△t)/(T 2 − t2))
Observe that the truncation error decreases with both
sampling frequency and sampling duration.
One may picture the original function as being a sum
of wavelets, each being an oscillating function that goes
to zero in the past and future and has a single global max-
imum. In the sum above, the maximum of each wavelet
occurs at one of the discrete points given by n and its
value is given by the value of the function at that point.
This implies that the space of band limited functions,
as a subset of the uncountable dimension vector space RR
is actually isomorphic to the much smaller countable di-
mension vector space Rℵ0 and approximately isomorphic
to Rn for very large but finite n.
Any function that is band limited by σ will be band
limited by σ′ for any σ ≤ σ′. It will thus have a rep-
resentation in σ which will effectively over sample the
function. This turns out not to be a problem as it simply
introduces dependencies between the sampled values. It
turns out that in such a case one may eliminate an arbi-
trary finite number of sampled values and still be able to
reconstruct the original function [42].
One limitation of the method is that the requirement
that f be an entire function means that it cannot be si-
multaneously band limited and time limited. There is
a form of uncertainty relation that holds in such a case
even though signals in reality may be both time and band
limited. This is a defect in mathematical modeling and
again to serves to emphasize that these models are ide-
alizations of reality and not exact models of reality.
We do have, however, the following theorem of Poussin:
If f is continuous and of bounded variation on [a, b] and
zero outside of this interval then
f(t) = lim
n→∞
∑
tk∈[a,b)
f(tk) sinm(t− tk)/m(t− tk)
where tk = kpi/m, k = 0,±1,±2, .. and m = n or m =
n+ 1/2, n = 1, 2, 3, . . .
The WSK theorem as originally stated refers only to
functions of time. A multidimensional version of the
WSK theorem was discovered by Parzen. If a function
f(t1, . . . , tN ) is band limited to a bounded N-dimensional
rectangle with bounds σi then one may write f as:
f(t1, . . . , tN ) =
∞∑
k1=−∞
· · ·
∞∑
kN=−∞
f(pik1/σ1, . . . , pikN/σN )sinc(σ1t1pik1) · · · sinc(σN tNpikN )
A problem for the formulation of the WSK theorem is that time (and space) must be subdivided into a regu-
25
lar lattice whose spacings must relate to the frequencies
of the sampling function. This suffices for an in-principle
demonstration of this approach such as is being presented
here but in reality there is no reason to expect that the
actual occasions should come into being in precisely de-
marcated space-time intervals. It is more reasonable to
assume the presence of at least a modest degree of vari-
ability in the relative positioning of occasions. This con-
stitutes the case of non-uniform sampling. Extensive re-
search has been devoted to studying non-uniform sam-
pling, the effects of various kinds of information deficits,
the use of different basis functions, the use of interpo-
lation for solving various differential equations, the use
of interpolation for wider classes of functions[16]. These
topics are beyond the scope of this paper but are impor-
tant for the development of this approach into a proper
alternative to standard quantum mechanics. As an ex-
ample of such an extension in the case that the function
is separable there is a very strong result known as the
Paley-Weiner-Parzen (PWP) Theorem.
Theorem: (PWP): Let Gi be the entire function de-
fined by
Gi(ti) = (ti−ti,0)
∏
ki
(1−ti/ti,ki)(1−ti/ti,−ki)i = 1, 2, ..N
Where ti,ki are real numbers satisfying the estimate
sup
ki
|ti,ki − kipi/σi| < pi/4σi i = 1, 2, ..N
Then for any signal in separable form f(t1, . . . , tN ) =
fi(t1) · · · fN (tN ) that is band limited to
∏
i[−σi, σi] we
have
f(t1, . . . , tN ) =
∑
1
· · ·
∑
N
f(t1,k1 , . . . , tN,kN )G1(t1,k1)/[G
′
1(t1,k1)(t1,−t1,k1)] · · ·GN (tN,kN )/[G′N (tN,kN )(tN ,−tN,kN )]
Unfortunately no such explicit series is known in the
case that f is non-separable.
THE TAPESTRY FORMULATION
Causal Tapestries
The framework to be explored here for representing
process is that of the causal tapestry. A causal tapestry is
a discrete structure which represents the actual occasions
that constitute the current transient now and process is
represented as a combinatorial forcing game with tokens
(reality game) which generates the next causal tapestry,
corresponding to the fading of the current now and the
creation of the next. The formal structure of the causal
tapestry has been described extensively elsewhere [39]
and presented in more detail in the appendix. The causal
tapestry draws upon ideas concerning the role of past in-
formation in determining the present [6, 46, 47] so as to
model a relativistically compatible transient now. The
basic element of a causal tapestry is the informon, which
takes the form [n] < α > {G} where n is a descriptive la-
bel (representing the realisation of actual occasions), α is
an ordered tuple (representing the interpretation) having
the general form (x, φ, p, f) where x is an element of a
causal manifold, φ an element of a Hilbert space, p a col-
lection of properties, for example lepton number, charm
and the like, and f is an element of a Lie algebra, and G
is a causally ordered set of ‘prior’ infomons. The causal
set G represents all of the information entailed within
those prior informons (actual occasions) that materially
contribute to the creation and existence of the current
informon (actual occasion). Interpreted, it will, in gen-
eral, be a subset of the past causal cone of the embedded
informon. The causal tapestry embeds into the causal
manifold as a space-like hyper-surface and the elements
φ form a collection of interpolation samples of a wave
function.
In order to properly describe reality from a process
theory perspective it is necessary to consider separately
the space of actual occasions and the processes that gen-
erate them. There are two fundamental causal tapestries
needed to describe a physical process - an event tapestry,
which generalizes the idea of a position space, and a tran-
sition tapestry, which generalizes the idea of momentum
space. These two tapestries are linked through duality re-
lations to form a reality tableau. The formal details are
presented in the appendix. Processes are implemented
by means of the reality game and therefore each process
may be considered as a game in its own right. The global
the reality game arises from the interactions among all
of these individual process games. Processes generate ac-
tual occasions but processes themselves may be rendered
active or inactive through the arising and fading away
of configurations of actual occasions. The processes will
thus form an ordered structure reflecting game play and
the activation or inactivation of these processes.
The reality game is based upon the idea of forcing. In
a reality game a pair of players successively carry out a
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set of tasks resulting in the creation of informons and in-
terpretation maps while remaining consistent with some
particular set of dynamical constraints, usually given by
means of some group or semigroup of symmetries such as
a differential equation.
The reality game generates a succession of reality
tableaux. Let (Ω,Π) denote a reality tableau. That is, Ω
is an event tapestry (L,K,M × F (M)×D× P (M ′), Ip)
and Π is a process tapestry (L′,K ′,M ′ × F (M ′)×D′ ×
P ′(M), I ′p) for which the tableau duality postulate and
the tableau consistency criterion hold. By a reality game
is meant a game which is given Ω and Π and at the
end of play has created new tapestries Ω′ and Π′ where
Ω′ = (L′′,K ′′,M × F (M) × D × P (M ′),Ω ∪ Ip) and
Π′ = (L′′′,K ′′′,M ′ × F (M ′)×D′ × P ′(M),Π ∪ I ′p) such
that (Ω′,Π′) form a reality tableau. Reality tableaux are
defined recursively and so require the assumption of some
prior set of prior tableaux upon which the reality game
is to be played. This prior set may be empty or may be
any self consistent set of tableaux.
The effect of the game is to create new sets of informons
and new sets of prior tapestries but with the interpreta-
tion structures left intact. The interpretation structures
remain invariant because, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, they provide the archetypal frame of meaning un-
derlying all information flow in the system. In order that
these frames of meaning remain consistent and coherent
through the history of the system it is necessary that they
remain invariant under the play of the game. A change
in the interpretation structures is interpreted as a funda-
mental change in some aspect of the system that results
in a significant difference in behaviour and properties, for
example a change of phase, or a change of symmetry or a
change of distinguishable constituents. It is true that in
general, information may evolve in a such a manner as to
force the emerge of a new semantic frame and thus new
interpretation structures. As noted above, the analysis
of such transitional situations is beyond the scope of the
current work.
NON RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM MECHANICS
In this section we consider a simplified model of NRQM
in (3+1) dimensions. While technically unsophisticated
it nevertheless provides an in principle demonstration of
this approach. We utilize sinc interpolation to generate
the state space interpretation and we do so on a regular
lattice. In general one would expect that a nonuniform
lattice would be more realistic, but in the case of sinc in-
terpolation it turns out that even if nonuniform sampling
is used, the sample values can be transferred to a nearby
uniform lattice and still achieve a good approximation
[48] so for ease of construction one might as well utilize a
regular lattice from the start. In NRQM the causal struc-
ture is quite simple, being the ordered product of R3,
treated as a antichain, and R, the time component which
generates the order. The geometry is flat, so that the
causal manifold is just M = R ⊗ R3. The state space is
just the usual Hilbert space H(M) of complex single val-
ued L2 functions onM. The lattice decomposition ofM
consists of all points of the form (n0tP , n1lP , n2lP , n3lP )
where tP is the Planck time and lP the Planck length
and the ni are integers.
We will embed each causal tapestry into a space-like
slice of the form (t,n) for fixed t and n ∈ R3. Thus each
causal tapestry corresponds to a space-like hypersurface
of M. Previous work has shown that any game played
out on causal tapestries that respects the causal struc-
ture will also respect Lorentz invariance [39]. Thus each
causal tapestry represents a ‘transient now’ with respect
to the causal structure. This is not equivalent to a no-
tion of simultaneity in the coordinate structure; that is
not preserved under Lorentz transformations.
In order to derive a connection with NRQM we utilize
the space-time approach developed by Feynman and ex-
pressed in his path integral formulation of quantum me-
chanics. There are two main reasons for this. The first
and most important is that the causal tapestry approach
provides an emergent generation of space-time and gener-
ates state space functions on a space-time point by point
basis and thus a version of quantummechanics which pro-
vides information at specific space-time points facilitates
a matching between these two approaches. Secondly, the
Lagrangian approach is, as Feynman pointed out, more
general than the Hamiltonian approach and so has wider
applicability. Several authors have pointed out how the
wave function can be constructed based upon past data
[6, 24, 46, 47].
Let us therefore consider the motion of a single parti-
cle under a Lagrangian L. Denote the reality game for
the particle as P. Since we are dealing with a single par-
ticle we shall simplify the discussion and focus just on
the event tapestry. Assume that a prior causal tapestry
Ip has been generated with current tapestry I. We con-
sider the next round of game play. The game is played
for n plays. The goal at the end of game play is to have
constructed a new causal tapestry, I ′ having informons
of the form [n] < α > {G} where α = (m, φ,p, τ) and
G is an ordered set derived from Ip ∪ I and φ provides
a interpolation component of the wave function of the
particle sampled at the point m. Since we are concerned
solely with the event tapestry we shall ignore the τ com-
ponent. We shall also consider the particle as being in a
single eigenstate so that we may ignore the p component
as well. The more general case will be discussed below.
Player 1 is free to choose any prior informon, say [n] <
α > {G} = [n] < ((tn,x), φn) > {G} where (tn,x) is the
lattice embedding, and φn is the partial wave function
contribution. The partial wave function has the form
Θn(α)sinc(α) where Θn(α) is a constant dependent upon
the embedding point of α and sinc(α) is shorthand for the
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product of sinc functions centered around the embedding
point of α. Player 2 selects a point on the next lattice
layer (tn+ tP ,y) where y is any R
3 point such that (tn+
tP ,y) lies on the lattice. The only strategy that Player 2
requires is to ensure that the pairing of prior and current
points has not been previously chosen. Player 1 now
constructs φm. The strategy for Player 1 is as follows.
Given the Lagrangian L, Player 1 calculates the ac-
tion corresponding to a straight line path from the point
(tn,x) to the point (tn + tP ,y). Let β = ((tn + tP ,y), )
be a partial interpretation. Denote this integral as
S[β, α] =
∫ (tn+tP ,y)
(tn,x)
dtL. Now place a token of the form
(tpl
6/A4)eiS[β,α]/ℏΘt1(α)sinc(β) on the site (tn + tP ,y).
A is a Feynman-Hibbs path integral normalization con-
stant. There may be existing tokens on the site. If so,
simply add it to the collection.
Finally Player 2 must determine a new content. Add
a second form of token consisting of an ordered sum of
the form Gˆ+ {[n] < α > {G}} where Gˆ is some up-set of
G. Again if there are pre-existing such tokens, then add
it to the collection.
Play continues until the allotted number of allowed
plays is reached. Note that a player does not have
to make a move on any given play if no appropriate
move is available. At the end of game play a new
informon is created which embeds to this site. First
any index element not previously used is selected, say
k. Then the interpretation β is completed, having the
form β = ((tn + tP ,y), φ) where the state function
φ =
∑
α(tpl
6
p/A
4)eiS[β,α]/ℏΘt1(α)sinc(β) with the sum
being taken over all state space tokens on the site and
A is a normalization factor described by Feynman and
Hibbs [34]. Finally a content H set is chosen having the
form H = ∪{Gˆ + {[n] < α > {G}}} where the union is
taken over all content tokens. The new informon is thus
[k] < β > {H}. This is done for every point on the new
lattice slice on which there are tokens. This collection
of informons I ′ becomes the new current causal tapestry
and the new prior tapestry set becomes I ∪ Ip.
Let L1 denote the collection of lattice sites correspond-
ing to the embeddings of informons of the prior tapestry
I. Feynman and Hibbs [34] show that, if Ψt1 and Ψt2 are
wave functions for a particle at times t1 < t2 respectively,
then Ψt2 can be calculated from Ψt1 using the transition
kernel as follows:
Ψt2(x) =
∫
K(x, t2 : y, t1)Ψt1(y)dV
In the case where |t2 − t1| = tP corresponding to
the time difference between two successive lattice slices
(causal tapestries), and dV = l3p, the spatial distance be-
tween adjacent lattice sites, the above integral can be
approximated on the lattice slice as
Ψt2(x) ≈
∑
y∈L1
K(x, t2 : y, t1)Ψt1(y)l
3
p =
∑
y∈L1
K(x, t2 : y, t1)
∑
y′∈L1
Θt1(y
′)sinc(y′)(y)l3P =
∑
y∈L1
K(x, t2 : y, t1)Θt1(y)l
3
p =
∑
y∈L1
∫
e
i
ℏ
S[(x,t2),(y,t1)]DyΘt1(y)l3p ≈
∑
y∈L1
e
i
ℏ
S[(x,t2),(y,t1)]Θt1(y)tpl
6
p/A
4
where in the last line above the action S[(x, t2), (y, t1)]
is calculated on a straightline segment between (x, t2)
and (y, t1) and K(x, t2 : y, t1) =
∫
e
i
ℏ
S[(x,t2),(y,t1)]Dy ≈
e
i
ℏ
S[(x,t2),(y,t1)]tpl
3/A4 using the Feynman and Hibbs ap-
proximation to the path integral (again S calculated on
a straightline path). Utilizing Parzen’s theorem [16], the
wave function may be approximated on the full spacetime
slice {t2} × R3 as Ψt2(z) ≈
∑
y∈L2 Ψt2(y)sinc(y)(z) =∑
y∈L2
∑
y′∈L1 e
i
ℏ
S[(y,t2),(y
′,t1)]Θt1(y
′)tpl6p/A
4sinc(y)(z).
In causal tapestry terms this becomes
Ψt2(z) ≈
∑
β∈I′
[
∑
α∈I
e
i
ℏ
S[β,α]Θt1(α)tpl
6
p/A
4]sinc(β)(z).
In other words, the sum of the state space elements
across the causal tapestry approximates the NRQM wave
function on the spacetime slice in which the causal
tapestry embeds. Moreover, Parzen’s theorem also shows
that in the limit of perfect transfer of information (infi-
nite game play) (n → ∞) and infinitesimal sampling of
space-time (lP , tP → 0), this sum converges uniformly
and absolutely to the wave function on the lattice slice.
This shows that the reality game model provides a dis-
crete approximation to the path integral and converges to
the proper path integral asymptotically, showing in turn
that NRQM emerges in the causal tapestry approach in
the asymptotic limit. Thus the reality game provides a
more fundamental theory than does NRQM, which be-
comes an emergent and effective theory. Even far from
the asymptotic limit, the causal tapestry approach can
yield highly accurate approximations to NRQM.
In the case that the particle has energy and momentum
bounded well away from the Planck limits, the difference
in values between the causal tapestry can be immeasur-
ably small. For example, at the sampling frequencies
considered here, namely Planck scale, using the Yao and
Thomas theorem [16, pgs 91-92], the truncation error is
approximately
tP l
3
P
pi4TL3 ≈ 2 × 10−151/TL3, where tP , lP
are the numerical values of the Planck time and Planck
length respectively and T, L are the durations and spatial
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extensions of the observations. Thus for an observation
at the smallest spatial and temporal intervals that can
currently be measured, this would give an error on the
order of 2 × 10−104 which renders the Schro¨dinger wave
function and the causal tapestry wave functions effec-
tively identical.
This also shows that we need not assume that the sam-
pling occurs at Planck scales and may treat the temporal
and spatial generating frequencies as independent vari-
ables and adjust the scales upwards until a significant
discrepancy occurs. For example, accepting a discrep-
ancy of say 10−10 this could allow for generating intervals
of up to 1030tP seconds and 10
20lP meters.
Note also that in this model of NRQM the only infor-
mation required to determine the informons of the new
causal tapestry are the informons of the current causal
tapestry, so that the content of each informons need only
consist of informons from the preceding causal tapestry.
Thus in NRQM the system evolves from one causal slice
to the next, in other words from one transient now to the
next. The situation is more subtle in the case of relativis-
tic quantum mechanics where the content set must come
(nontrivially) from the past light cone of each informon
and the embedding into the causal manifold takes a more
complicated form.
Superposition States: The Case of Multiple
Subprocesses
The scenario above applies to the case of a simple pro-
cess for a particle in an eigenstate. In the case of a parti-
cle in a superposition of eigenstates the play of the game
is more subtle. Suppose that the wave function of the
particle Ψ =
∑
i wiΨi where Ψi are eigenfunctions of
some operator and wi are the usual weights.
The process generating the particle can be considered
as a sum of subprocesses, each generating an eignestate.
Then we may write the process as P =
∑ˆ
iwiPi where the
Pi are the corresponding subprocesses and the weights wi
are interpreted as for sums of token games. Note that the
exclusive sum is used here. This ensures that an actual
occasion corresponding to a single eigenstate, meaning a
single ontological state, of the particle manifests at any
particular lattice site. This means that the particle it-
self is never in a superposition of ontolgically distinct
states; it is only the process that generates the particle
that can be in a superposition. In order to keep track of
which subprocess is manifesting in a particular informon
we must now include properties in the interpretation of
each informons. Here it suffices to add a property i which
means that the i-th subprocess applies to this informon.
The interpretation of an informon will now take the form
α = (m, φ, i). Each site will therefore also acquire a to-
ken for the process, here i. Except when a new informon
is generated, a subprocess may only be played on sites
on which the token corresponds to that subprocess.
Play proceeds more or less as in the previous case. On
any given play one of the subprocesses is chosen to be
played, say Pi. When Player 1 makes their first move
they may only extend from an informon whose interpre-
tation is of the form α = (m, φ, i). If they extend to a
token naive site, the site is given a token i. If the site
already contains tokens then it must contain only i to-
kens. This is important when relativistic conditions arise
because of the more complicated structure of the causal
space. This emphasizes the role of the content set which
carries relevant causal information from the causal past
into the present. The idea is that an extension of a pro-
cess from the causal past into the future involves a transi-
tion from informons previously generated by the process
to informons currently being generated by the process.
This process is somewhat akin to a percolation front ex-
cept that the updating of the front occurs sequentially
and in a saltatory manner. Informons thus propagate
outwards from informons of origin.
Once the above consistency check has taken place the
remainder of play is as described above since effectively
now only a single subprocess is involved.
The selection of sites for the individual subprocesses
may be random or in the case of only a finite superposi-
tion of subprocesses (say n) the lattice may be subdivided
into multiple regular lattices but with a much larger lat-
tice separation, (nlP ). When one moves to the emergent
level of the global wave function one notes the follow-
ing. Due to the consistency criterion, the interpolated
wave function on the content of a given informon having
property i will correspond to an approximation of the
eigenstate wave function Φi on the past causal cone of
its embedding point. On the current causal tapestry I,
the interpolation has the form
ΦI =
∑
[n]<α>{G}∈I
wiΘnsinc(α) =
∑
i
∑
[n]<α>{G}∈I|α=(m,φ,i)
wiΘnsinc(α) ≈
∑
i
wiΦi ≈ Φ
Thus the interpolation subdivides into a sum of inter-
polations defined over disjoint sublattices of the current
lattice slice. This is also true for the global interpola-
tion taken over the entire history of causal tapestries.
On each of these sublattices the interpolation provides
an approximation to one of the weighted eigenfunctions.
Each of these interpolations may provide an accurate ap-
proximation to the actual eigenfunction over the causal
manifold and thus their sum to the wave function itself.
In the case of a random distribution of lattice sites sup-
porting the interpolation one takes note of the fact that
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for wave functions corresponding to particles having en-
ergy and momentum bounded far away from the Planck
scales, these interpolations correspond to a rather signif-
icant oversampling of the individual eigenfunctions and
one may use a result of Marks [42] which shows that in
such a case the missing samples may be reconstructed
from the given samples, so that there is in effect no miss-
ing information about the eigenfunction and it may be
reconstructed perfectly. In the case of the regular lat-
tice decomposition one notes that for a superposition of
a reasonably small number of eigenfunctions, the lattice
spacing will still provide a sampling of the original func-
tion at a lower frequency, but so long as this frequency
still exceeds the Nyquist frequency for the eigenfunction,
it will provide an accurate interpolation.
Thus at the level of the informons, when the causal
tapestry is generated by the reality game at every step of
play only a single informon is being generated and it will
correspond to a single well defined ontological state of the
particle. As play proceeds the particle will manifest all
of the eigenstates individually and distributed through-
out the causal tapestry, and so effectively throughout
the causal manifold. At the level of the observer one
will observe only the interpolated wave function, which
will correspond to a superposition of these eigenstates.
There is no paradox here. The problem arises as a result
of the inherent inability to resolve reality at the level
of the individual actual occasion. One can have a real-
ist dynamic operating at the lowest level even though at
the level at which we can observe reality one sees only
these seemingly paradoxical superpositions. The super-
positions reflect the nature of the generating processes,
not the nature of the reality being generated.
REALITY GAME MODEL OF MEASUREMENT
Bohr understood the process of measurement to pro-
vide a correspondence between some aspect of a quantum
system and the behaviour of a classical measurement ap-
paratus. This conforms to the actual situation when an
experimenter carries out a measurement. Not every ap-
paratus can serve as a measurement apparatus. For ex-
ample, one could place a dial on one bob of a kicked
double pendulum and attempt to measure the momen-
tum of a particle by letting it collide with the kick plate.
The subsequent motion of the dial will be chaotic, so
that even if a particle with exactly the same momen-
tum hits the plate, the resulting motion of the dial will
be effectively random and decidedly non-Gaussian, so no
single measurement value can be determined. Rather a
measurement apparatus must have the property that an
activation (or interaction) with the device results in a
transition of states within the apparatus that ultimately
results in a single stable fixed state, from which can be de-
rived some token like a mark or a dial position which can
then be translated into a measurement value. Dynami-
cally this means that the phase space of the measurement
apparatus must subdivide into multiple stable basins of
attraction all leading to fixed points asymptotically and
every activation or interaction will place the apparatus
into one of these basins of attraction. Moreover, there
must be a stable correspondence between the activation
and the subsequent basin, so that identically prepared ac-
tivations will result in the apparatus entering into, more
or less, identical basins of attraction. In the quantum
mechanical setting this means that if copies of the quan-
tum system can be placed into identical eigenstates then
the measurement apparatus will be in identical basin of
attractions after interaction. The basins should be sta-
ble, attracting, and separated. In particular they should
not be tangled or lead to chaotic behaviour. The size
of the basin determines the resolution of the apparatus.
Once a triggering or interaction has taken place the ap-
paratus should evolve within the selected basin until the
fixed point has been reached. In other words the po-
tential well associated to the basin should be sufficiently
deep so as to prevent the apparatus from jumping from
one basin to another, even in circumstances in which the
triggering entity continues to interact with the apparatus
over an extended period of time.
These are general considerations which appear reason-
able to demand of any apparatus purporting to be a mea-
surement apparatus. In the model of measurement out-
lined below we model only these general features and not
the specifics of any particular apparatus.
Let us consider the situation of a single particle inter-
acting with a measurement apparatus. The particle and
the apparatus are modeled by distinct reality games, P
and M respectively. We assume that the particle is in a
superposition of eigenstates Ψi (with eigenvalues λi) of
its Hamiltonian. In NRQM the state of the particle would
be represented as Ψ =
∑
i wiΨi for some weights wi. We
assign a distinct game Pi(λi) to generate each eigenstate
and consider the particle game as a weighted combina-
torial sum of these lesser games, P =
∑
i wiPi(λi). The
weight in this case modifies the value of the state in-
terpretation of each informon generated. Likewise treat
each basin of attraction of the measurement apparatus as
a distinct subsystem and assign to each a distinct game
which generates its own dynamic. If the set of possible
measurement values is {µj}, then to each value we as-
sign a game Mj(µj) and we consider M =
∑
jMj(µj)
where the appropriate normalization is subsumed within
Mj(µj).
The fundamental algebraic structure of functional
analysis is that of a vector space, and just as a vector in
a finite dimensional vector space may be decomposed as
a sum of basis elements, so can any element of a Hilbert
space. Generally a Hilbert space will possess multiple dis-
tinct bases and so given two such bases {φi} and {σi} we
may write any element Ψ as Ψ =
∑
iwiφi =
∑
j vjσj . In
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functional analysis one is free to choose any basis at will
and represent any vector within that basis. In the ideal
world of mathematics this occurs without any physical
implications. Again the functional analytic framework
captures an algebraic relationship but without any aspect
of ontology. The mathematics demonstrates that which
is implicit in the structure of the wave function and what
is to be expected should such a change in measurement
basis be carried out but it doesn’t specify how this change
is to be realized in reality. While a change of basis in a
finite dimensional vector space can be viewed merely as
a change of reference frame, or perspective, a change of
basis in quantum mechanics represents a change of mea-
surement serving as the underlying basis for the observa-
tion. It does not merely represent a change of observer
or of position of an observer. It reflects, rather, a fun-
damental change in how the observation is being carried
out and what kind of measurement apparatus is being
utilized to carry out the observation.
In the reality game perspective, a decomposition of a
wave function as a sum of the form Ψ =
∑
iwiφi implies
that the actual occasions that underly the particle are
being generated by a process which can be decomposed
into a sum of simpler processes as P =
∑
iwiPi where
each subprocess wiPi generates the wave function con-
tribution wiφi. A change of basis therefore implies not
merely a change of perspective but a change in the very
processes that are generating the actual occasions. That
is, a change of basis carries ontological significance and
is not simply epistemological.
Let us fix a context within which to observe a quan-
tum system and let that system experience an evolu-
tion described by a wave function Ψ. Furthermore, let
there be two distinct basis decompositions of Ψ, namely,
Ψ =
∑
iwiΨi =
∑
j w
′
jΨ
′
j . There will be distinct real-
ity games (processes) Pi generating Ψi and P
′
j generat-
ing Ψ′j . Thus there will be corresponding reality games
P =
∑
iwiPi and P
′ =
∑
j w
′
jP
′
j, both of which gener-
ate Ψ. We say that the reality games (processes) P,P′
are Ψ-equivalent and write P ≡Ψ P′. Note that under
a different context it may be the case that these reality
games no longer generate the same wave function. This
is a result of the non-commutativity of many quantum
mechanical operators.
For simplicity let us ignore details of experimental er-
ror. The measurement process is understood as taking
place in three stages. In the first stage, prior to the initi-
ation of any interaction between the particle and the ap-
paratus, the two games are played freely, so that the com-
bined process can be represented as P⊗M = (∑iwiPi)⊗
M = (
∑
i wiPi)⊗ (
∑
jMj(µj)) =
∑
i
∑
j wiPi ⊗Mj(µj).
In the second stage, the particles enters into the region
of the measurement apparatus. In this stage there is no
exchange of physical attributes such as energy, momen-
tum, spin, mass etc. Instead the measurement apparatus
establishes a new set of boundary conditions which re-
sults in a purely informational effect upon the processes
generating the particle. This information results in a
reversible change in the processes generating the wave
function. This occurs, as described above, because it is
precisely those particle states that are eigenstates of the
operator corresponding to the measurement apparatus
that are preserved under an interaction with the appa-
ratus. Only these states can survive an interaction with
the apparatus for a long enough period of time so that
a measurement can take place. Although the processes
generating the wave function have changed, the observed
wave function remains unchanged. We may now write
this new process as M(P) = P′ =
∑
j w
′
jP
′
j(λj) where
P′j represents the process that generates the eigenfunc-
tion Ψj(λj) corresponding to the eigenvalue λj of the
measurement apparatus. Here M(P) denotes that the
process P′ was derived from P under a change of basis
to that of eigenfunctions of the measurement apparatus.
Since the wave functions generated by P and M(P) are
related by a change of basis, they represent the very same
wave function, Ψ and so P ≡Ψ M(P). Although this in-
teraction is purely information, it nevertheless results in
a transition of processes, which we write as:
P ⊗ M = ∑i∑j wiPi ⊗ Mj(µj) → M(P) ⊗ M =∑
k
∑
j w
′
kP
′
k(λk)⊗Mj(µj).
Now each subprocess of M(P) can couple only with
certain subprocesses of the measurement apparatus (cor-
responding to nearby measurement values) so that the
combined process at the initiation of measurement
will be represented more accurately as M(P) ⊠ M =∑
j
∑
j′∈H(j)(w˜jj′P
′(λj) ⊗ Mj′ (µj′ )) where H(j) is the
set of measurement apparatus states to which the parti-
cle state i couples. In the case of no error this becomes
P⊠M =
∑
j w˜jP
′(λj)⊗Mj(λj).
In the third stage the particle enters into the region in
which a physical interaction with the measurement ap-
paratus becomes possible. The actual initiation of in-
teraction becomes a function of the coupling between
particle and apparatus. That is, with each play of
the game there will manifest a particle informon, say
[n] < α > {G}. Let α = (m, φ,p). By assump-
tion, the state function φ of this informon will be gen-
erated by some process of the form w˜jj′P
′(λj) for some
eigenvalue λj , so that it will be an interpolation con-
tribution to w˜jj′Ψ
′
j(λj), the eigenfunction corresponding
to λj . Note that φ(m) = w˜jj′Ψ
′
j(λj)(m). There will
also manifest a measurement apparatus informon, say
[m] < β > {H} which is being generated by some sub-
process, say Mj′ (µj′). The likelihood that the particle
process will couple to the measurement apparatus process
will be expected to depend upon the value of the interpo-
lation component at that site and so should be propor-
tional to φ∗(m)φ(m) = w˜∗jj′Ψ
′∗(λj)(m)wjj′Ψ′(λj)(m).
The likelihood that it will fail to couple is thus propor-
tional to p = 1 − φ∗(m)φ(m). If it does not couple then
a new informon is created and the likelihood that it will
31
not couple will again be proportional to 1 − x for some
non-zero x. The probability that it will not couple after
two plays is proportional to p(1−x) and this will rapidly
tend to zero with successive game play. Thus almost cer-
tainly at some point a coupling will be initiated between
the particle and the apparatus.
The wave function thus determines the likelihood of
coupling between the particle and measurement appara-
tus processes. It will also determine the coupling to many
different processes. Its interpretation as a probability dis-
tribution over causal manifold, however, is contextual,
requiring the presence of a suitable measurement device
whose measurement values correspond to positions in the
causal manifold. The correspondence then is a secondary
emergent one, requiring the intermediary measurement
apparatus.
Suppose that this current particle informon couples to
the current measurement apparatus informon. Then the
global process undergoes a transition to an interactive
process which is substantially reduced from the original
process, namely
w˜kk′P
′
k(λk)⊠Mk′ (λk′ )
or in the case of no error to
w˜kP
′
k(λk)⊠Mk(λk)
.
The particle process has undergone a transition which
means that the descriptor no longer refers to the origi-
nal generative process but only to the current process.
As a consequence there will no longer be any play to
those informons whose descriptors are for the previous
process and its subprocesses. The same is true for the
measurement apparatus as its generative process is now
restricted to the interactive version ofMk(λk). Note that
if the particle exits the measurement apparatus and is
observed again by an identical measurement apparatus
it will again couple to the same component of the second
measurement apparatus but if it should be observed by a
new apparatus then a new coupling will arise as a result
of the transition that will be induced in the generating
process by the interaction with the new measurement ap-
paratus.
At every stage of play only a single informon is mani-
fest, providing a determinate reality, but as these infor-
mons lie below the level of resolution of any physical ap-
paratus only the coherent whole of the resultant tapestry
and its state is actually observable. Repeated plays of
the game will yield different outcomes. The apparent
stochasticity of the quantum system arises from the in-
herent non-determinism of the game, not from an inher-
ent indeterminism in the actual occasions themselves -
the level of ultimate reality. Moreover the collapse that
is observed in the wave function is not a collapse at the
level of ultimate reality, which only ever manifests single
informons, but rather at the level of process and merely
reflects that fact that any interaction between processes
potentially alters those processes.
The Schro¨dinger cat paradox can be understood as
arising from the conflation of actual occasion and pro-
cess in the Schro¨dinger formulation described previously.
Prior to the release of the cyanide following the radioac-
tive decay of the trigger material, the cat and the poison
device play out uncoupled processes, and thus can be de-
scribed by a free game of the form P(cat) ⊗ P(poison).
There is no superposition of cat and device because there
is no physical interaction taking place between the cat
and the device. Unless the poison is released, the cat
will remain alive unless it dies from natural causes wait-
ing for the experimenter to release it. Once the poison
has been released, however, the game changes and there
is now an interactive game between the cat and the device
of the form P(cat dying)⊠P(poison released). The even-
tual outcome of this is a dead cat. Although in NRQM it
is permissible to construct a superposition state of the
form Ψ(live cat)Ψ(no release) + Ψ(dead cat)Ψ(release)
this is not possible in the game setting and this
would need to be written as Ψ(live cat)Ψ(no release) ⊕
Ψ(dead cat)Ψ(release) reflecting the fact that there is an
interaction between the two games, namely that once the
second game is played it is no longer possible to play the
first game. The Schro¨dinger cat paradox is thus a conse-
quence of the limitations of the functional analytic repre-
sentational system and is not a statement about reality.
The difficulty in a paradox like Hardy’s paradox arises
because of an attempt to apply a wave function level
statement to informon level events. Again there is no
paradox, just a misapplication of a formalism to an inap-
propriate level. So long as the system is not disturbed the
photon process will indeed generate photon informons in
both arms of the apparatus but only one informon at a
time, so that it appears as though the photon is both
wave and particle simultaneously. But these are reflec-
tions of different levels of observation and the apparent
paradox arises when the two are improperly conflated.
One last point concerns the issue of ”quasi-locality”.
The informons being generated to form the new causal
tapestry utilize information that is entirely local to each
individually. The content set refers to prior informons,
but this refers only to the original source of the informa-
tion. It is presumed that there is a forward causal chain
linking every informon within the content set to the infor-
mon and it is understood that such information has been
passed forward along that causal chain to be incorporated
into the informon as it comes into existence. Thus the in-
formation may have originated in the past but it reaches
the informon in the present as it is formed. Therefore it
is actually local to the informon at hand. Moreover, the
informons that constitute any actual occasion are space-
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like separated, and this is true of the informons as they
are formed to create the new causal tapestry. No infor-
mation passes between informons within the same causal
tapestry. Again, whatever information they use in their
formation is local. Thus the informons form a set of local
hidden variables. They are described, however, as being
quasi-local because the process or processes that generate
them act non locally in that they are free to add to the
content of any informon on any given play, regardless of
which informons have already been generated and where
they are located in space-time. The processes exist in a
mathematical universe that is outside of space and time.
Game play may be thought of as taking place on a time
scale infinitesimally smaller than the Planck time (or per-
haps in a second time similar to Bars’s two time physics
[43] or stochastic quantization [44]). Note that while the
processes may generate any informon on any play, no in-
formation is passed between these informons and so the
non local actions of the processes do not induce any non
local information exchange between informons and thus
the constraints of special relativity are not violated.
A SIMPLE TWO SLIT EXPERIMENT
To illustrate the ideas above let us consider a simple
model of a free non relativistic particle passing through a
two slit detector and then impinging on a plate detector.
This will illustrate the basic ideas of the game approach.
There are two players here, one corresponding to the par-
ticle and the other to the detector. For simplicity, assume
that the space is two dimensional, 0the source of the par-
ticle is at the point on the manifold denoted (0, 0), the
two slits lie in the x = a plane while the detector lies
in the x = b plane. The slits span the two regions from
y = c to y = d and from y = −c to y = −d. Again
for simplicity we shall assume that the embedding to the
manifold is to a regular lattice whose spatial spacing is
on the order of Planck length (lP ) and temporal spacing
on the order of Planck time (tP ).
Denote the game of particle as P. The game is played
for n plays. The players alternate play with the particle
player playing first. The play of the detector is simple
since nothing happens except to restate the presence of
the detector until it is triggered by an interaction with
the particle. In considering the play of the particle, sup-
pose that the prior tapestry has already been generated.
Particle is then free to choose any prior informon, say
[n] < α > {G} = [n] < ((tn, xn, yn), φn,p) > {G}
where (tn, xn, yn) is the lattice embedding, φn is the
partial wave function contribution, and p = {p, pi} is
a set of properties including those local to the specific
actual occasion (p) and those that connect it to the pro-
cess that generated it (pi). The partial wave function has
the form Θnsinc(α) where Θn is a constant and sinc(α)
is shorthand for the product of sinc functions centered
around the embedding point of α. Let the new infor-
mon be [m] < β > {K} where β = ((tn + tP , xn +
mxlP , ym+mylP ), φm,q) for integersmx,my, q = {q, pi}
and K = {[n] < α > {G}}.
Since the particle is free after passing through the
slits we can take the Lagrangian for the particle to be
L = mv2/2. Let S[β, α] denote the action calculated
along a straight line path from the embedding point of α
to the embedding point of β over the time interval from
tn to tn + lP . Then the new wave function contribu-
tion has the form φm = e
i
ℏ
S[β,α]TtP TmxlP TmylP φn. Sup-
pose that the embedding point has already been chosen
in several previous turns. Let the informon associated
with it at the current play be [m] < ((tn + tP , xn +
mxlP , ym + mylP ), φm) > {G} where G is now a set
of prior informons. Then if at the current play par-
ticle extends [n] < α > {G} to this same embedding
point, then this informon is updated as follows. G is re-
placed by G ∪ {[n] < α > {G}}. The updating of φm
is rather complicated and so we illustrate it first in one
dimension. The extrapolation to high dimensions fol-
lows fairly easily. In one dimension then suppose that
the points of G embed to the lattice points x1, . . . , xk.
Assume that these are ordered and assume, in this or-
dering, that β lies between xk and xk+1. Then we set
φm =
1
A (e
i
ℏ
S[β,t2](t2 − t1) + . . .+ e iℏS[β,α](α− tk) +
e
i
ℏ
S[β,tk+1](tk+1−α) + · · ·+ e iℏS[β,tn](tn− tn−1))sinc(β).
A is the Feynman-Hibbs normalization factor which here
has the form A = (2piiℏtPm )
1/2.
Play continues until the allotted number of allowed
plays is reached or the game has already ended. Note
that a player does not have to make a move on any given
play if no appropriate move is available.
Note further that the contents of informons will nat-
urally separate out into those corresponding to a pas-
sage through one slit and those corresponding to passage
through the second slit. Separating out these contribu-
tions, one can naturally divide the original wave function
into two distinct wave functions corresponding to these
two histories and the final wave function will therefore
be a superposition of these individual wave functions and
the expected interference in probabilities will also occur.
This works until the particle reaches the detector plate.
At that point game play by particle is able to influence
game play by detector. In particular, play by detector
is actually a sum of plays, one for each location along
the detector. So we should properly write the game
as a sum of games so when moves by particle bring
events physically close to the detector we write moves as∑
x∈I
∑
y∈I cx,yΠx ⊗∆y where Πx are particle moves to
spatial location x and ∆y are detector moves indicating a
detection at spatial location y and cx,y represent a form of
coupling constant indicating the degree of association be-
tween moves. This coupling is expected to be a function
of the wave function of the particle at x and of the detec-
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tor at y. Usually this is given as a local integral of a form∫
Ψ∗AΨdz where Ψ is the particle wave function and A
an operator representing the action of the detector. The
idea is that the detector acts upon the particle resulting
in a transformation of its wave function and the product
gives the probability of finding the particle therefore in
such a state. Here though something different occurs.
The position detector is arrayed upon a two dimensional
surface which is parallel to the plate containing the slits
and set at a fixed distance downstream. The detector
possesses constant depth. The details of the detector are
not relevant. It is only necessary that, however the de-
tector is constructed, the energy of a particle interacting
with the detector be dissipated through the depth of the
detector in a direction roughly perpendicular to the sur-
face. There should be minimal dissipation parallel to the
surface so that when the final measurement is ‘read’, it
corresponds roughly to the location of the initial inter-
action. The degree of parallel spreading determines the
resolution of the detector. Divide the spatial surface of
the detector into (possibly overlapping) regions Bx, each
being a ball centered on the point x. Let us model the
detector game D as a sum of games,
∑
x
HBx , each game
generating the informons associated with the internal ac-
tivities of the detector in the spatial cylinder centered on
the point x. The idea is that some stimulus takes place
somewhere at the top of the cylinder and activity propa-
gates through the cylinder to the opposing surface which
registers the event, perhaps as some form of mark. In
the absence of a triggering event, the play of each game
is rather simple, generating a replica of the existing in-
formon advanced in time according to the time slice of
the current tapestry.
In the absence of interaction, this sum of games is
rather trivial since the moves are null in all cases, which
simply means that the detector is passive. Prior to any
interaction, the particle and detector games are played
as a normal free product, P⊗ D, meaning that moves of
particle and detector are independent of one another.
Suppose now that at a particular play, particle gen-
erates, for the first time, an actual occasion that lies
within the region of the detector. Let the informon so
created be [n] < (x, φ) > {G}. The local wave func-
tion associated with this informon is φ, which has the
form Ψ(x)sinc(z − x). Let the informons of the detec-
tor have the form [a] < (y, ρ) > {K} where the points
y lie within the volume occupied by the detector. Each
of these informons is generated by one of the detector
games, say HBx , according to whether or not y ∈ Bx.
Then the original process is replaced by a new process
P′ = P ⊗ (∑{y,x∈By}HBy). This new process generates
informons originating at [n] < (x, φ) > {G} while the
remaining informons of the prior tapestry no longer con-
tribute since they correspond to the original process P
which is no longer active. The nature of the detector is
such that the combined process P′ will concentrate in-
formons in a small region around x and eventually to a
single detector game, say HBy which results in a position
measurement of y being recorded.
The onset of interaction between particle and detector
changes the game being played. At the point of interac-
tion the game shifts from a free product to an interactive
product. The coupling between particle game and de-
tector game is determined in part by the strength of the
particle process at the point x. We assume that there is
no bias in the detector so that the strength of the detec-
tor process is uniform across the detector. The coupling
will depend in part upon the momentum and energy of
the particle. Obviously particles that have a momentum
not directed into the detector or of too high an energy
will not be captured. The probability of interaction will
therefore be a function of the detector and of the par-
ticle. Let the detector contribution be given by some
operator V which acts upon the wave function to project
onto possible detector states and this couples to the par-
ticle wave function as Ψ∗VΨ. The coupling probability
is proportional to this term. Now this is a local coupling
but because of the difference in scale between the particle
and the detector we must integrate over the region of the
local game. Thus the probability will be proportional to
the volume integral
∫
By
φ∗Vφdν
If the particle process couples to the detector process
it will eventually transition to some simple coupled game
of the form P ⊗ HBy. When this happens, the detector
essentially acts like a giant slit centered on the region By
and the particle process will proceed concentrated within
this region. If it does not couple then play will continue
according to the current combinatorial sum, which will
generate another particle informon and other detector in-
formons. Note that with repeated play the probability of
the particle not coupling trends to zero and given the as-
tronomically large number of plays this means that it will
couple with certainty somewhere. Moreover the proba-
bility that this somewhere corresponds to the region By
is given as above, and so corresponds to the spatial prob-
ability distribution given by the wave function according
to the standard Born interpretation. However the wave
function in this case determines the coupling of processes
- the probability aspect is derived and reflects the par-
ticulars of the particle-detector interaction. Thus the
probability in this case is emergent and contextual, as
required of a non-Kolmogorov probability.
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RELATIONSHIP TO HIDDEN VARIABLE
THEOREMS
Informons provide a form of quasi-local hidden vari-
able. Each informon represents a discrete entity within
its causal tapestry and as interpreted in the causal mani-
fold but its interpretation in the state space is ‘fuzzy ’ and
has the character of an extended object. Nevertheless the
information necessary to determine a move lies internal
to the informon, residing in its content. That content
appears to be nonlocal but in fact the information con-
tained therein is precisely such information as could be
transmitted from the causal past to the site in the causal
manifold at which the current informon manifests. That
is why the information can be viewed as already being
incorporated into the informon. In that sense it is local.
There remains an element of nonlocality, however, in the
manor of play which (borrowing a term from the author
Alfred Bester) jauntes from one space-time location to
another. But no information is transmitted through this
nonlocality. Indeed in the space of processes there is no
space-time. The processes and games exist outside of
space-time as do their actions in manifesting game play.
One could think of game play as taking place in a second
time dimension as in stochastic quantization [44] or two
time physics [43]. Equally one can consider game play
taking place on a time scale infinitesimally smaller than
the Planck scale so that the complete play of a game takes
place within an interval of duration equal to the Planck
time. One should view process as being atemporal and
it is the creation of actual occasions that results in an
emergent space-time. The jaunting associated with pro-
cess does not violate special relativity since it conveys
no signal and does not occur in space-time but rather
pre-space-time.
These informons are closer in ontological status to the
individual events of Bohm’s model than to hidden vari-
ables per se. Nevertheless it is necessary to ensure that
they do lead to violations of the various hidden variable
theorems [3]. Those come in two main forms - those
of Bell and Leggett-Garg type involving relationships
among various correlation functions based upon the wave
function, and those of K-S and GHZ type, which involve
relations among various measurement operators. In the
reality game approach, measurements apply only to the
emergent wave functions and not to the informons them-
selves, which manifest at scales well below those of any
physical apparatus. K-S and GHZ type results assume
that the functional analytic formulation holds at the low-
est level of reality, but this is an assumption not a fact.
If indeed quantum phenomena are emergent phenomena
then there is no a priori reason to assume this. Indeed
in the model presented here, the dynamics at the level
of ultimate reality is described by combinatorial forcing
games with tokens, and the standard functional analytic
formulation is viewed as an emergent interpretation of
this lower level dynamic. Indeed informons are associ-
ated with partial state functions of the form Ψ(x)TxΦ(z)
and there is no requirement that Φ(z) be an eigenstate
of any self-adjoint operator. This is clear in the case of
interpolation via sinc functions. Thus the argument used
in the K-S and GHZ theorems does not apply here since
the measurement operators cannot be applied to these
ultimate states.
Bell and Leggett-Garg type inequalities are all ulti-
mately derived from the wave function, so it suffices to
demonstrate that the state interpretation of the event
tapestry approximates the wave function of the quan-
tum system well enough to avoid violating the quan-
tum mechanical predictions for these inequalities. How-
ever from the results presented above, we know that for
Planck scale lattice spacings, the Yao and Thomas theo-
rem suggests that the truncation error is approximately
2 × 10−151/TL3, where T, L are the durations and spa-
tial extensions of the observations. Even with errors in
calculating Ψi,j(x), the interpolated wave function will
reproduce all of the usual quantum mechanical calcula-
tions, including the Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities.
CONCLUSION
When NRQM was initially formulated nearly a century
ago, the mathematics used for its expression was a min-
imal extension of that used in classical mechanics. The
shift was from differentiable functions on point sets to
linear operators on Hilbert functions spaces. Although
beautiful mathematically, the embodiment of NRQM in
functional analytic language has been a mixed blessing,
leading to many philosophical and technical problems. It
is said that even Von Neumann himself was dissatisfied
with the representation. In particular it has led some
to consider notions of reality that are anthropomorphic,
solipsistic and even nihilistic, denying that there even is
reality. Many of these arguments derive from the (mis)
application of Bell’s Theorem. Following the insights of
Palmer and Khrennikov, it now appears that there is a
fundamental flaw in Bell’s argument, namely the implicit
assumption that the statistical structure of any form of
classical hidden variables must conform to the laws of
Kolmogorov probability theory. This assumption is false,
and depends upon the dynamics and types of interactions
governing these variables. Functional analysis is limited
algebraically to only single forms of addition and mul-
tiplication which leads to a conflating of event and pro-
cess factors in the model. This in turn results in many
paradoxes. Shifting to a particular class of combinatorial
forcing games with tokens results in a non-Kolmogorov
probability structure and enables one to exhibit a quasi-
local, realist, hidden variable model capable of reproduc-
ing NRQM. Although the model exhibited in this paper is
overly simplistic in many respects, it nevertheless demon-
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strates in principle that by shifting to the mathemat-
ics of combinatorial games it becomes possible to bring
realism back into quantum mechanics. The model 0in-
corporates ideas of process theory: becoming, persisting,
fading away and a transient now, all compatible with rel-
ativity. The price to be paid is to postulate the existence
of an underlying layer of ultimate reality manifesting at
Planck scales and which is inherently unobservable. This
lower level is discrete, but fuzzy, and motion consists of
discontinuous saltatory jauntes. Observable phenomena,
events and space-time itself, are emergent from this low-
est level. The experience of continuity is also emergent,
arising though a process of interpolation. NRQM must
be viewed as an effective theory, not an ultimate theory.
Following Whitehead’s process theory, the model pro-
poses that there are two components to reality: the ac-
tual occasions which superpose to create through interpo-
lation an emergent observable reality, and the processes
that generate these occasions. These processes exist in
an aspatial, atemporal algebraic universe whose struc-
ture conforms in part to a configuration of Lie algebras.
The value of the combinatorial game structure is that it
allows for the possibility of a non-Kolmogorovian prob-
ability structure even though the events are classical in
nature. The role of the players in the game is entirely
heuristic, facilitating the implementation of the dynam-
ics without any ontological assumptions. The game set-
ting provides a much richer variety of sums and products
corresponding to the myriad ways in which games may be
combined, which models more closely the diverse ways in
which physical processes may combine. These additional
forms of linearity and of products are necessary to resolve
the paradoxes that plague NRQM.
The advantage to this model is that one obtains a
richer mathematical structure, free of paradoxes, realist
in nature, and conceptually simpler than current mod-
els. It has a fundamentally discrete character which may
help to eliminate the infinities that hound quantum me-
chanics, especially quantum field theory. It provides a
realist view of ultimate reality which is quasi-local (lo-
cal at the level of actual occasions but non-local at the
level of process or game play) and which avoids anthro-
pomorphic and solipsistic thinking and ever more fanciful
constructions that stretch credulity. In doing so it follows
the principle of Occam’s razor, finding a simpler model
that produces the same results. The disadvanage of the
model is that one must accept that quantum phenomena
are emergent upon an underlying (inherently unobserv-
able) layer of reality manifesting at Planck scales, and
that quantum mechanics, like general relativity, must be
understood as an effective theory. In this model conti-
nuity is the illusion and time has a definite orientation
and flow. This appears to be a small price to pay for the
eradication of the measurement problem and the various
paradoxes, for eliminating wave-particle duality, for po-
tentially eliminating the various infinities and for giving
a sense of reality back to quantum phenomena. The next
step is to attempt to extend this model into RQM and
eventually to QFT. That work is hampered in part by the
current state of the art in interpolation but should lead to
fruitful interchanges between that branch of mathematics
and quantum physics and provides abundant opportuni-
ties for future research. Perhaps in the future we will
also develop better models of process which transcend
the game approach.
Thanks are due to Irina Trofimova for many lengthy
and fruitful discussions about emergence, process, and
the fundamental role of relations and interactions, and
to Robert Mann for for his sage advice and boundless
patience.
APPENDIX
Causal Tapestry
The construction of a causal tapestry is recursive with
the ground set assumed but usually left unspecified for
simplicity. Here we shall denote the ground set by Ip
and its set of informons by Lp and refer to it as the
prior set (prior referring to the construction process, not
necessarily an indicator of any temporal relationship).
Definition: Let K be an index set of cardinality κ, M
a causal space, Ip a union of causal tapestries. Then a
(strict) causal tapestry I is a 4-tuple (L,K,M, Ip) where
L is a set of informons (loci) satisfying the following con-
sistency conditions:
1. Each informon in L has the form [n] < α > {G}
with n ∈ K, α ∈ M and G an acyclic directed
graph whose vertex set is a subset of Lp .
2. The union of all H such that [n] < α > {H} lies in
L, i.e. ∪{H |[n] < α > {H} ∈ L} forms an acyclic
directed graph.
3. [n] < α > {G}, [n] < α′ > {G′} ∈ L implies
G = G′ and α = α′
4. [n] < α > {G}, [n′] < α > {G} ∈ L implies that
n = n′
5. [n] < α > {G} ∈ L implies that [n] < α > {G} is
not an element of G
6. [n] < α > {G}, [n′] < α′ > {G′} ∈ L implies that
neither [n] < α > {G} ∈ G′ nor [n′] < α′ > {G′} ∈
G
7. [n′] < α′ > {G′}, [n′′] < α′′ > {G′′} ∈ 0G and
for some [n′′′] < α′′′ > {H} there is [n] < α >
{G} ∈ H , then [n′] < α′ > {G′} ∈ H implies that
[n′′] < α′′ > {G′′} ∈ H
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8. The mapping i : Lp ∪ L→M given by i([n] < α >
{G}) = α is a causal embedding, meaning that it
should be an injective causal order preserving map.
The identifier of [i] < α > {G} is i, the content is G
and is denoted by c(i) and the interpretation is α and is
denoted by e(i).
Definition: Let K be an index set of cardinality κ,
M = M × P a mathematical structure such that M
is a causal space, P a generic mathematical structure
termed attributes, Ip a union of causal tapestries with
attributes. Then a causal tapestry with attributes is a
4-tuple (L,K,M, Ip) such that (L,K,M, Ip) is a causal
tapestry
In the causal tapestry formalism, each informon is la-
belled by its interpretation, and so each interpretation
should carry information about the spatiotemporal asso-
ciations of the informons as well as linkages to the dyadic
tapestry.
Event and Process Tapestries
The tapestry corresponding to the space of actual oc-
casions, the event tapestry is defined as follows:
Def0inition: An event tapestry Ω is a causal tapestry
with attributes, that is, a 4-tuple (L,K,M, Ip) where K
is an index set of cardinality κ, M = M × F (M) ×D ×
P (M) a mathematical structure with M a causal space,
F (M) a function (state) space, either Banach or Hilbert,
D a space of descriptors (properties), P (M ′) either a Lie
algebra or tangent space on a manifold M ′, Ip a union of
event tapestries. The event tapestry serves as a general-
ization of the notion of a position space.
Likewise we may define a process tapestry as follows:
Definition: A process tapestry Π is a causal tapestry
with attributes, that is, a 4-tuple (L′,K ′,M′, I ′p) where
K ′ is an index set of cardinality κ, M′ =M ′ × F (M ′)×
D′ × P ′(M) a mathematical structure with M ′ a causal
space, F (M ′) a function (state) space, either Banach or
Hilbert, D′ a space of descriptors, P ′(M) either a Lie
algebra or tangent space on a causal manifold M , I ′p a
union of process tapestries. The process tapestry serves
as a generalization of the notion of a tangent space (and
perhaps as a generalized momentum space as well).
Together these tapestries form an interlinked dyad.
Thus the interpretation for each informon in the event
tapestry Ω takes the form (x, f, d, p) where x is an ele-
ment of the causal manifold M (spatial location), f is a
function on the causal manifold (state or trajectory), d
is a vector of descriptors such as mass, charge, and p is0
an allowable transition on the process tapestry. A simi-
lar interpretation holds for each informon of the process
tapestry.
An important concept in both mathematics and
physics is that of duality. Duality refers to two distinct
mathematical structures whose properties are neverthe-
less intertwined by some mathematical operation (an in-
volution) that serves as its own inverse. The state space
and momentum space representations in quantum me-
chanics are dual to one another and related by means
of the Fourier transform. Event and process tapestries
also exhibit an aspect of duality, although it is less exact
except in special cases.
Let Ω be an event tapestry (L,K,M × F (M) ×
D × P (M ′), Ip) and Π a process tapestry (L′,K ′,M ′ ×
F (M ′)×D′×P ′(M), I ′p) with their structures appropri-
ately interlinked.
Let C(Ω) denote the graph formed by taking the union
over all content sets of informons of Ω and C(Π) denote
the graph formed by taking the union over all content
sets of informons of Π. These are both acyclic directed
graphs by virtue of the consistency conditions for causal
tapestries.
Consider first C(Ω). Each vertex a serves as end ver-
tex for a set of edges E(, a), and initial vertex for a set
of edges E(a, ). Each edge in the event tapestry repre-
sents a flow of information from the initial to the termi-
nal vertex arising through the process of origination of
the informon as a consequence of the play of the reality
game. The process that enables this flow of informa-
tion to take place is one that manifests in reality, and
thus corresponds to a physically realizable transition or
transformation. This transformation is represented in
the archetype interpreting the causal tapestry as either
a global symmetry operation or as a local tangent. This
in turn should correspond to an informon in the process
tapestry. Thus we expect that there should be a mapping
of the edge set of C(Ω) into the vertex set of C(Π). Like-
wise, each edge in the process tapestry marks a flow from
one transition to another transition and each such tran-
sition between transitions requires some form of manifes-
tation of an actual occurrence to express it. This reflects
the fact that the presence of an actual occurrence has a
meaningful impact upon reality, and that impact mani-
fests itself as an influence shaping the particular manner
in which the next actual occasion will come into being.
That process of coming into being, being marked by some
transition, will therefore be altered by the manifesting of
an actual occurrence, and so some new process may be-
come manifest. Thus it makes sense that each transition
between transitions should correspond to some informon
which manifests the information that influences the ap-
pearance of the next transition. Thus it is reasonable to
expect that there should exist a mapping from the edge
set of C(Π) into the vertex set of C(Ω).
Unfortunately it will usually be the case that each ver-
tex of either graph will have more than one edge for
which it is terminal or initial. In order to get around
this problem let us define a new graph called a cover-
ing graph. Let G = V,E be a generic directed graph.
For each vertex v ∈ V , define a new vertex set by
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{e(, v)} × {e(v, )}. Let V (CG(G)) consist of the union
of all such vertex sets for v ∈ V together with all ter-
minal vertices of V (a vertex is terminal if it is not the
initial vertex of any edge). For any pair of such vertices in
V (CG(G)), e(a, v)e(v, b) and e(c, v′)e(v′, d), define 00an
edge e(e(a, v)e(v, b), e(c, v′)e(v′, d)) if and only if b = c.
For any terminal vertex v ∈ V , define an edge (v, φ). De-
fine the new edge set E(CG(V )) to be the union of all of
the above edges taken over all of V .
Definition (Tableau Duality Postulate): Let Ω and Π
be event and process tapestries respectively. Let C(Ω)
and C(Π) denote their respective content graphs. Then
there exist subgraphs C′(Ω) and C′(Π) of CG(C(Ω))
and CG(C(Π)) respectively such that there exists an
order isomorphism between C′(Ω) and C′(Π) with
V (C′(Ω)) mapping to E(C′(Π)) and E(C′(Π)) mapping
to V (C′(Ω)).
Moreover, in general we require an additional criterion
to be met.
Definition (Tableau Consistency Criterion): Let Ω and
Π be event and process tapestries respectively which sat-
isfy the tableau duality postulate. Let [n] < α > {G}
and [n′] < α′ > {G′} be informons within the content
set of some informon of Ω and assume that [n] < α >
{G} → [n′] < α′ > {G′} in the content graph. By
the tableau duality assumption there will exist an in-
formon [i] < β > {H} within the content set of some
informons of Ω such that this edge maps to this infor-
mon. Now α = (m, f, d, g) and α′ = (m′, f ′, d′, g′) and
β = (s, e, h, l). Then we also require that m′ = l(m). A
similar result holds for Π. This ensures that if each infor-
mon is interpreted as an element of the causal manifold,
then each edge is interpreted as a transformation from
one element to the next.
Definition: A reality tableau consists of an event
tapestry Ω and a process tapestry Π that satisfy the
tableau duality postulate together with the tableau con-
sistency criterion.
The processes involved in the creation of actual occa-
sions will now generate a succession of reality tableaux.
This occurs through the repeated play of a reality game.
THE REALITY GAME
As in the case of forcing games, the reality game re-
quires the completion of a set of tasks.
Consider an event tapestry Ω first as the case for Π is
analogous. Assume that the index set K has sufficient
cardinality to account for all possible informons, past,
present and future. In a universe of discrete events, a
countable K will usually suffice. Otherwise it can gener-
ally be taken to be 2κ where κ is the cardinality of the
informon set of the current tapestry.
First of all, a new set of informons must be generated.
Each informon has the form [n] < α > {G} with n ∈ K,
α ∈M and G an acyclic directed graph whose vertex set
is a subset of L ∪ Lp .
First, select an unused element n′ ∈ K and form a bare
informon [n′] <> {}. Next, a content must be selected.
The elements of the new 0content set must lie in L∪Lp.
In general, in order to ensure that the consistency con-
ditions are properly met, each content set will consist
of the union of an up-set of a prior content set together
with one or more informons from the current tapestry in-
cluded as maximal elements. An up-set Gˆ of an ordered
set G is a subset of G such that if x lies in Gˆ then every
element y in G such that x < y also lies in Gˆ. The new
content set may have only one current informon, which
means a simple extension. It may have several current
informons, which means an interaction is about to take
place. It may also be the case that several new informons
may possess the exact same content (though of course the
labels and interpretations will differ), which corresponds
to the case in which multiple processes originate from a
given informon (such as occurs following an interaction).
If G is an ordered set, let Gˆ denote an up-set of G. If G
and H are ordered sets, define the ordered sum G+H to
be the ordered set such that every element ofH is greater
than every element of G. Then the different possible
outcomes take the form:
1. Given an informon a = [n] < α > {G}, add an
informon of the form [n′] < α′ > {Gˆ+ {a}}
2. Given a collection of informons {ai = [ni] < αi >
{Gi}}, add an informon of the form [n′] < α′ >
{∪iGˆi + {ai}}
3. Given an informon [n] < α > {G}, add a collection
of informons {ai = [ni] < αi > {Gi}} where Gi =
Gˆ+{a} (n00ote Gˆ may be different for different Gi
)
Each informon of Ω must also be interpreted within
its mathematical structures. These interpretations must
meet additional criteria:
1. [n] < α > {G} and [n] < α′ > {G} in L implies
α = α′
2. [n] < α > {G} and [n′] < α > {G} in L implies
that n = n
3. Let [n] < α > {G} and [n′] < α′ > {G′} be in-
formons within the content set of some informon
of Ω and assume that [n] < α > {G} → [n′] <
α′ > {G′} in the content graph. There exists an
informon [i] < σ > {H} within the content set of
some informon of Π such that if α = (m, f, d, g)
and α′ = (m′, f ′, d′, g′) and σ = (s, e, h, l), then
m′ = l(m).
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4. The mapping i : Lp ∪ L→M given by i([n] < α >
{G}) = i((x, f, d, p)) = x is a causal embedding,
meaning that it should be an injective causal order
preserving map.
5. Let the mapping m : Lp ∪ L → F (M) be given by
m([n] < α > {G}) = m((x, f, d, p)) = f . Define an
interpretation of the content G, denoted m(G) by
setting m(G) = ∪Gm(a) (a ∈ G).
6. The game dynamics relative to any particular infor-
mon should depend upon its interpretation, the in-
terpretation of its content (which renders its mean-
ing in terms of the archetypal interpretation), as
well as the interpretations of surrounding infor-
mons. The game dynamic may involve additional
constraints such as conservation laws, symmetry
rules, extremal principles as so on.
Conditions 4 and 5 provide the critical criteria which
any reality game must ensure are satisfied. Interpolation
theory provides the means to satisfy them. Interpola-
tion provides the essential bridge between the discrete
structure the informons of the reality tableaux and the
continuous structure of their interpretations in the causal
manifold and in the state (or trajectory) space. The cor-
rect choice of the embedding into the causal manifold
which determines the sampling, and the frame functions
(such as sinc(x) above) which generate the interpolation
into the function space, will depend upon the details of
each individual model. Only sinc interpolation will be
discussed here but there are more general approaches to
interpolation for a wide variety of function spaces, includ-
ing an approach specifically for graphs such as causal
tapestries [45]. Generally speaking, the sampling need
only be uniformly distributed throughout the space-like
hypersurface into which the informons embed. The frame
functions will depend upon the symmetries and bound-
ary conditions of the problem. The sampled values can
be generated through an application of Greens functions
techniques (which are determined again by symmetries
and boundary conditions) to extend from prior informons
to these new informons. In this way the reality game en-
ables the entire history of a system to be generated, or
bootstrapped from a set of initial conditions.
A useful heuristic tool for working with reality games
is the token, which is the formal analogy of a game piece
such as a chess piece, or checker piece. The generation
of an actual occasion may occur in several steps, partic-
ularly when non-local contributions from multiple prior
occasions must be integrated 00into a new occasion. The
use of tokens permits the reality game to keep track of
this information until game play is completed, at which
point the tokens may be exchanged for the completed
actual occasion. Tokens constitute Whitehead’s unob-
servable parts making up the indecomposable whole of
an actual occasion.
Assume that the set of descriptors, D, for some causal
tapestry possesses some algebraic structure and that the
elements of D can be generated from some subset, B,
using those algebraic operations. A set of tokens, T , is a
set of elements together with a mapping T → B which
assigns values to each token. A reality game with to-
kens is a reality game together with a set of tokens, T ,
where at the end of each move, some token t will be
attached to some bare informon [n] <> {}t1 · · · tn →
[n] <> {}t1 · · · tnt, which might possibly have some se-
quence of tokens t1 · · · tn already attached. At the end
of play this token sequence will be stripped off and an
interpretation and content inserted.
The dynamics of a physical process is imple-
mented by means of a co-operative, two player,
combinatorial, forcing game with tokens, the reality
game, which generates a succession of reality tableaux
(Ω,Π), (Ω1,Π1), (Ω2,Π2), . . ., unfolding the history of a
system. Dynamical laws are formulated as strategies for
the players of this game. Games are used to represent
the properties and actions of processes. The role of the
player is entirely heuristic, enabling the implementation
of the game dynamic, representing the intrinsic, implicit
and necessary functionality required of process for the
creation of informons. The concept of the player is not
meant to be taken literally and there is no implication as
to the existence of any form of intentionality or agency.
Play proceeds for a fixed number of steps prescribed in
advance during which players alternate in performing one
of a set of tasks on either tapestry of the reality tableau.
Tasks for Player 1 include choosing an index (thus creat-
ing a bare informon [k] <> {}), constructing the content
G of an informon, and laying down tokens, which serve
both construction purposes and denote various proper-
ties. The content G can have one of three forms depicted
in the following graphs, where k and l represent newly
created informons and informons m and n come from
L∪Lp. Here,(a) corresponds to single process extension,
(b) to process inactivation, and (c) to process activation.
k k l . . . k
↑ ր տ տ ր
n n . . . m n
(a) (b) (c)
Tasks for Player 2 include choosing an element of the
causal manifold, choosing a weight for the interpolation
basis element and choosing a transformation element.
For both players, each move must satisfy various consis-
tency criteria. At a given step a player may choose not to
move. The game is a win for Player 2 if the global state
obtained by summing the states of all informons in the
tapestry interpolates the correct wave function to within
some predetermined tolerance. The goal is to identify
strategies for Players 1 and 2 which ensure that Player 2
always wins.
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Strategies of interest for Player 2 build interpretations
following an idea of Kempf [38] for the construction of
continuity from discreteness based on Shannon sampling
theory. In its simplest version, Player 2 embeds infor-
mons into the causal manifold M so as to form a sam-
pling of M , and embeds them into the state space H(M)
using a biorthogonal basis composed of translates of a
template function Φ. Each informon contributes a term
Ψ(xi)TxiΦ to a global wave function obtained by sum-
ming contributions over the informons (with or without
their contents). The usual representation of a state as
a linear superposition Ψ =
∑
iwiΨi of eigenfunctions of
some operator A is not useful here as the weights wi are
defined as integrals over the entire causal manifold M
whereas a reality tableaux corresponds only to a discrete
sampling of a space-like hypersurface of M . However,
the weights Ψ(xi) can be defined for individual infor-
mons and calculated using variants of Green’s functions
or path integral methods applied to the current tapestry
(including content sets in time dependent settings).
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